THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke*

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CONFERENCE SERMON

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II Cor. iv 7: But we have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power may be of God and not of us.

I would begin by recalling to your minds the singular circumstances which attended upon the recent death and burial of Professor Gilbert Murray. From his youth to, at any rate, within a month of his death at the age of 91, he had repudiated all loyalty to any of those institutions, church or sect, which guard and preserve what is traditionally and explicitly held to be sacred. A Roman Catholic priest claimed that shortly before he died he submitted himself to the rule of his Church, while his remains have been laid to rest in Westminster Abbey, which the Victorian journalist would have described as a sacred edifice. Gilbert Murray gave no worship to any god with sacred ritual and cult, but no man devoted his life more thoroughly to the worship of truth, beauty, righteousness, peace and justice. What is conventionally termed sacred meant so little to him that for any church to claim him within its fold can only be regarded with the same kindly irony which he turned upon all self-styled religions.

Eagerly the two most influential communions of our land have offered the protection and honour of their sacred rites to this apostle of the autonomy of the secular and one who might be paradoxically but properly described as a secular saint. Some Romanists attempted to anticipate the inevitable sneers of the secular world if their Church had judged such an erring son beyond the reach of covenanted grace. Westminster Abbey, if it is to preserve its status both as the resting-place of the nation's illustrious dead and as the instrument of a Church established by a completely secularized state, could not ask if he repeated its creed or practised its sacra.

The whole incident vividly illustrates the present confusion between the secular and the sacred which prompted me to suggest this distinction as a theme for our conference. There is no agreement on what is sacred and what is secular; many would even think the distinction unreal; that there is almost nothing left in all the manifestations of human life which is not secularized would be universally acknowledged. Man is on the march, as Field-Marshal Smuts declared some years ago, but he marches with no standard unfurled or sacred image to defend. The tribal gods alone perhaps still command an allegiance which neither the Christian tradition nor Karl Marx have been able to retain.

There still seems to be only one thing still regarded universally sacred, if what is so abstract and yet at the same time so concrete can be called a thing, i.e. life itself, not life just as experienced at the moment but life as it might be, imagined in an infinite variety of forms and yet always compounded of the stuff of life as we know life, the kind of life of which the saints, poets and artists have always asserted that they have been given a foretaste. Schweitzer's principle, 'Reverence for life', is a definition of the sacred all can understand and to which all can assent. Life in abundance and richness is granted to us all in some rare moments or perhaps even only reflected to us through intimations and overtones from poet, musician, and painter. The Christian Church won its way only because it brought to men this gift of life. To quote some words from Charles Beard's well-known lectures on the Reformation (*The Reformation*, Charles Beard, p. 427):

> 'What Christ brought into the world was not so much new truth as fresh life—not so much ethical principles and precepts unknown before, as an enlarged capacity of moral obedience and growth . . . It is this which raises Christ above the level of the teacher, and gives him his claim to be called, however you may define the word, the Saviour of the world. It is this which justifies the contention of Evangelical divines of every school, that we go to him not to learn the outlines of a system, moral or theological, but to be inspired, moved, changed, saved. One of those deep sayings which seem to me to show that the author of the Fourth Gospel had access to a genuine fund of Christian tradition, which but for him would have perished, is, "I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly." '

Christ made explicit what all religions and indeed all experience imply, that that enriched life can never be ours unless we are already in touch and indeed surrendered to that transcendent enriched life beyond us and yet around us here and now, within ourselves and yet beyond the reach of definition, God, the natural object of our worship and prayer. But we have our treasure in earthen vessels. If the term life denotes at the same time the most abstract of forms and the most concrete of substances, i.e. our very existence, how easily and almost inevitably Christians have come to take the various symbols by which they have expressed that transcen-

dent life belonging to God and the traffic between God and man as representative signs of God himself, too often as life-giving, divine in themselves, and therefore sacred in themselves. The earthen vessel is mistaken for the treasure. The name of God is taken as God. The temporal accidents of the historic Jesus are taken as the marks of the eternal Christ. 'Let our name,' wrote Fr. Tyrrell (*Lex Credendi*, p. 141), 'or notion of God, the system of our theological ideas, be petrified irreformably, and all further religious experience is sterilized and squandered for lack of dogmatic expression and record; the name of God from being a help becomes a hindrance; through the alteration and growth of its object the representation becomes a misrepresentation. Identified with such a misrepresentation God becomes for us unreal and even unlovable.'

When we identify God and His name we fall into idolatry, and so far as the world repudiates the traditional distinction between the secular and the sacred it judges the Christian sacra to have become the worship of idols and mummery. To my mind we are called not to some trifling reform of our liturgy or creed but to a radical interior revision of the spirit and purpose animating our worship and prayer. Hallowed be Thy name: Thy Kingdom come. It is not enough for us to subordinate the naming of God to the worship of God himself revealed to us as the spirit of Christ. The hallowing of God's name, i.e. the concerns of the visible Church, are but subordinate as a means to the coming of God's Kingdom. The roots and springs of life are the matter of religion, but the roots only exist for the sake of the fruit. In that sense, for the Christian there is to-day only one thing left, i.e. by the extension of the rule of law and the application of justice to prepare the ground for the reign of charity and grace. Thirty years ago a programme of bringing the kingdom of God on earth was the fashionable interest of many clergy and young students of theology. The programme closely resembled that of the contemporary social reformer. Experience perhaps has taught us that the rich are not always exceedingly sinful and the oppressed not invariably saints. The truth is, we are always to seek to satisfy the demands of justice, but we shall never overtake them. Yet the petition, 'Thy Kingdom come', governs 'Hallowed be Thy name'.

Perhaps there are here glimmerings of a revaluation of the sacred and the secular as it is being unfolded in these days of seeming darkness and yet also of pregnancy; first and supreme, the holy of holies, that sacred place in the heart of man where man is rooted to the transcendent world of the Spirit and Christ is risen, the purpose animating all life that by creativeness life should be lived abundantly, subordinately the naming of the Spirit sacred only in a secondary manner by association with the Holy Spirit, as the door derives its glory from the chamber. Otherwise it is to be reckoned as equivalent to all our other concerns which give our lives content and are the bricks and mortar of God's kingdom. Men the

world over are asking Christians to declare their treasure, not indeed scattered and wasted, but in vessels which are frankly valued as earthy and fragile. A German minister who has spent twenty years in Japan wrote to me as follows: 'Is not what we need to-day a de-Westernization of Christianity? Has our civilization enough vigour to provide the answer for the social, political and spiritual upheaval through which the world is passing? To be sure Christ has the answer. But does Western Christianity present Christ as this answer? Is our continental dogmaticism releasing the power of the risen Lord or does it bind Him? Is the Christ the guiding ideal of our Christianity? Or are we led by sub-Christian forces in Western civilization?' A member of a delegation from the Episcopal Church in America which last year visited the Church in South India writes: 'Almost every Christian leader with whom we talked emphasized the fact that missionaries should be sent out who have as their primary purpose only that of serving India and Indians rather than evangelizing. They are generally sceptical of what is called "mass evangelism" because they feel that in the past it has simply resulted in baptized Hindus, people who have become Christians without really knowing what it meant and often in the hope primarily of improving their material conditions. If a missionary, whether he be a minister or layman, lives the life of humble service, the spirit of Christ will speak louder through his work than through any words he may preach. The nature of the Hindu seems to be that if an effort is made to convert him, he is apt to recoil, but if he sees someone living a life of vital service, he respects him and frequently seeks to find the spirit which motivates such a person. As a result he may become an inquirer, receive Christian instruction and convert himself.' It all seems to come to this. The world demands that it is not sufficient to call upon the name of the Lord or to teach men to do so; that however ancient our vessels be, though they should bear the stamp of Jesus himself, earthy they remain, serviceable only to transmit abroad the treasures of the Spirit. May God grant us by our deliberations the judgment to discern between vessel and treasure and the power of decision in our several vocations to manifest what has been proclaimed as 'a religion unencumbered and unentangled with contingent and perishable values, free as an arrow in its flight home to the universal conscience of humanity'.

THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR IN PRIMITIVE RELIGION

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In opening an inquiry into 'The Sacred and the Secular' treated in a quasi-Hegelian manner under the headings Integration and Disintegration, to which this Conference is to be devoted, a consideration of the general theme in its setting in primitive society would seem to be an appropriate starting-point for several reasons. In the first place, in this state of culture the relation of the sacred to the secular is more easily determined than in the complex, highly developed civilizations in the modern world and in their immediate antecedents. Moreover, in recent years in this country social anthropologists have been mainly concerned with the investigation of culture as an integrated system, concentrating attention on the functions of social institutions, custom and beliefs as an integral part of such a system. Therefore, instead of endeavouring to determine origins and developments as heretofore, the present method is to analyze social activities and the ideas associated with them, of which, of course, religion is of primary importance, and not least our problem of the Sacred and the Secular.

Since the sixteenth century of our era religion in this country has been regarded chiefly as an essentially personal relationship between an individual and the Deity on which the well-being of his immortal soul depends. Interpreted psychologically, the emphasis has been placed upon the emotional approach to the sacred and transendental order of reality, however this may have been conceived. In the case of primitive peoples, explanations of their religious reactions have been sought in affective rather than in cognitive states—appetites and emotions rather than reason being the motive force, with awe, the numinous, for projection as the key words. Against these interpretations of religion, at the beginning of the present century Durkheim and his colleagues grouped round *L'Année Sociologique*, and subsequently their followers in this country, maintained that social facts cannot be explained in terms of individual psychology, and as religion is essentially a social phenomenon it is not an individual matter. On the contrary, it is alleged to be a self-revelation of society; a mechanism devised for purely practical purposes of integration and consolidation, of internal unity, peace and concord. The universe, on this hypothesis, is divided into the sacred and the profane so that the supernatural is the negation of the natural. Collective representation concerning the sacred leads to the establishment of 'a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.[1] In short, in a

[1] Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915), p. 47.

general way, it is maintained, society has all that is necessary to arouse the sensation of the Divine in minds, merely by the power that it has over them.'[2]

Before examining this contention in greater detail, there is another closely allied aspect of the theory that has to be considered. Thus, according to Lévy-Bruhl, 'the reality in which primitive peoples move is itself mystical.' Everything, it is said, appears to be permeated by forces, influences and actions, which though imperceptible to sense, are nevertheless real. Consequently, the world of fact becomes full of mystery. The primitive thinks in terms of collective representations in which objects are not divided from one another, but united in a bond so intimate that each participates in the other, making a thing what it is not. By this 'law of participation' is explained how a man may believe himself to be at once a human being and an animal, and may be present simultaneously in many places.[3] This is attributed to primitive peoples being in a 'prelogical' stage of mentality, completely immersed in a mystical frame of mind. It is not, however, lack of logic that characterizes their outlook but a particular attitude to the relation between the sacred and the profane, the natural and the supernatural, mind and matter, cause and effect. As Marett has said, 'the savage has no word for "nature". He does not abstractedly distinguish between an order of uniform happenings and a higher order of miraculous happenings. He is merely concerned to mark and exploit the difference when presented in the concrete.'[4]

If he identifies things which seem to us mutually exclusive, and asserts essential connexions between things which we regard as having nothing to do with each other, it is because he has little or no conception of universality and continuity of natural causation. Therefore he attributes to supernatural agencies every object or event which arrests his attention or demands an explanation. Cause and effect, agent and act, are not clearly differentiated because his logic is at fault but because he has an imperfect understanding of natural laws and processes, and a different conception of the relation of the sacred to the secular. Thus, animals pertain to his own domain and are the sources and agents of his food supply. Moreover, they may possess powers in which he is himself deficient—muscular strength, keenness of sight and smell, a remarkable sense of direction and ability in tracking, flying, and running with terrific speed. Therefore, they are regarded as superior to man and may be assigned an ancestral status in the human group, as in totemic society. Consequently, they are held in great veneration and surrounded with tabus because they

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 206.

[3] Lévy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions dans les Sociétés Inférieures* (Paris, 1915); *La Mentalité primitive* (1921); *L'Expérience mystique et les symboles chez les primitifs.* (Paris, 1938.)

[4] *The Threshold of Religion* (1914), p. 109.

belong to the sacred order and stand in the most intimate relation with the human group in the capacity of its supernatural ally, or totem.

The vital bond between them is ratified and sealed in a collective ritual by means of which a sacramental union is established with the totem as the beneficient source of Providence. As a result of the due performance of these rites the tribe as a whole gains good hunting and collecting, and so receives a plentiful food supply because a right relationship is maintained with its ultimate source in the sacred order. By sharing in the food sacramentally with the particular totem of the group, the totemites share with the sacred species in the beneficial powers of their Providence. Thus, life is retained and renewed in a co-operative ritual which promotes general well-being and consolidates its members in a closely-knit sacred order, thereby exercising a powerful integrating influence in the social structure.

The entire universe, as this is conceived by the primitive mind, belongs, in fact, to one great system of inter-related and inherent life—probably the unconscious expression of the religious emotion itself. As human beings, individually and collectively, become associated with the religious emotion, the inherent vitality becomes symbolized in particular species and beings with which man identifies himself. In such a relationship, no contradiction is involved because the identification of the symbol with the thing symbolized arises from the introduction of a third term in the equation. In the case of the totemic relationship, the union is achieved by the supposition that the human group participates in the spiritual nature of its sacred ally from whom it is descended, and it is this common element which effects the bond between them, making them by the addition of an extra quality what otherwise they would not be. Among the Nuer of the Southern Egyptian Sudan, for instance, the links between a lineage and its totem is the tutelary spirit of the lineage associated with the totem. The natural species is not identical with a spirit except in relation to its lineage. The two are distinct entities, yet they both partake in a common element in relation to something else, i.e. the totem.[5] Similarly, when the relationship is represented by a material symbol the symbol is regarded and treated in the same way as the spiritual entity it symbolizes, not because it is thought to be other than it actually is, but because it has acquired a spiritual quality which does not belong to it in its own nature, without changing its outward and visible form and character.

This sacramental conception of symbolism does not contravene either logic or 'the law of contradiction'. It merely presupposes the existence of an extra-mundane sacred order standing against, and in a particular relation with, this world over which it exercises spiritual control, determining the course of events and human destinies. This is a fundamental religious assumption at all times and in all states of culture where the existence of a transcendental sacred order of reality is admitted, however

[5] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Nuer Religion* (Oxford, 1956), pp., 64f., 76, 93ff.

crudely and naïvely, or mystically and metaphysically, it may be expressed and interpreted. In primitive society it lies behind the ritual control of natural processes and events, the kinship with the animal creation, and all the many and various socio-religious institutions devised to facilitate what is called in the idiom of Lévy-Bruhl the process of mystical participation. When, for example, a ritual expert arrays himself in the skin and antlers of a stag or in the feathers of a bird, and imitates the behaviour of the species he personifies, he does so in the belief that for the time being and for the prescribed purpose, he is what he represents himself to be, and in that capacity he does not imitate but he actually does what he sets out to do. He catches the prey; he makes the reproduction of offspring effective; and he establishes a sacramental relationship between man and the sacred order on which he and the tribe he represents depend for their daily food, maintaining its abundance by a co-operative effort.

Now Durkheim and his followers were perfectly right in their contention that religious facts are bound up with social facts, and that religious institutions and beliefs have taken shape very largely around such practical requirements as the maintenance of the food supply and the integration of the social fabric in a cohesive and harmonious tribal and family organization in which ritual experts occupy a key position in relation to the sacred. But while the common body of beliefs, institutions, sanctions and values which he calls 'collective representations' are an integral part of the social structure and are influenced by it, they are not merely a symbolic representation of the order of society. So far from society having 'all that is necessary to arouse the sensation of the Divine in minds merely by the power it has over them so that for its members it is what a god is to his worshippers', it has always been to the sacred order transcending the social sanctions and processes of nature that religion has made its appeal. As the late Professor Clement Webb pointed out, the notion of the Divine rather than being a mere mirage of social facts is an 'implicit theory of the universe. The human mind necessarily conceives itself with the All, though it always starts in doing so with its immediate social environment, and only gradually realizes that this is not the dominant fact in the universe.'[6]

Thus, the conception of the sacred in primitive belief involves an interpretation of the universe in terms of super-causation; of supramundane Power or Providence regarded as the sum total of the beneficence and bounty of the world and its processes in the maintenance of the food supply and the continuance of the forces on which prosperity and well-being depend, both physical and social. Its institutions, rites and techniques have been the means whereby the disabilities of want, sterility and all the evils to which flesh is heir are overcome. To confine the discipline to its social manifestations is a legacy from Comte's severance of Man from

[6] *Group Theories of Religion* (1915), p. 151.

Nature and his equation of religion with a 'subjective synthesis' of Humanty as a self-contained and self-creative being interpreted in relation to the attributes of Deity. Whereas it is to an 'otherness' beyond itself and its social environment—to a super-sensuous sacred order—that the religious discipline is directed at all times as the Ultimate Reality, however the experience may be evaluated in conceptual and social terms.

When due recognition is given to this transcendental aspect of the sacred in which the universe is believed to be rooted and grounded, and by which it is thought to be governed and controlled, it is unquestionably true that primitive society is organized on the basis of a spiritual and moral order conditioned by a common tradition of beliefs, institutions and sanctions which serve the purposes of a consolidating dynamic. Aided by symbol, ritual and myth, human energies have been both conserved and conveyed into new activities which have exercised an integrative function enabling mankind living under precarious environmental conditions to meet crises with confidence and hope by assimilating life-giving protective energies and so to preserve or restore a state of equilibrium.

Thus, at all the critical junctures from the cradle to the grave the career of the individual has been unified and controlled by the supernatural forces believed to govern his life, just as the community at large has been consolidated by the same forces thought to determine the course of nature and the sequence of the seasons, especially at the turn of the year marked by the Annual Festival. In short, faith in a sacred order centred in the Providential ordering of natural events, human destinies and the social structure, has been a fundamental element in primitive society in the maintenance of a common way of life, in common standards of value, and in common norms of behaviour. It is this which has resolved human groups into a sacred community integrated by the ritual techniques and the associated beliefs and institutions in which the fundamental concepts are expressed and actualized. When natural resources fail frustration, instability and disintegration are met by spiritual energy and sacred power made efficacious through symbolic actions and their oral representations acting as a vent of collective emotion.

The pressure of events in the external world and in the circle of human relationships, the perpetual struggle for existence and survival, the innumerable daily frustrations and awe-inspiring experiences, often completely outside the control and beyond the comprehension of man, create a tension seldom felt in a modern civilized community except in times of very exceptional stress. When such a situation does occur the reaction is not very different in any type of society. But when subsistence depends on the chase or the hazards of the seasons, with all the dangers and uncertainties of a precarious natural environment, the emotional strain is endemic. Therefore, under these conditions myth and

ritual as the recognized method of dealing with the situation are fundamental.

Around the trinity of primary instincts of self-preservation, the propagation of the race and the cohesion of the group, the religious sentiment has developed; feeding and protection, breeding and living together being the emotional centres of the myth and ritual that express the most urgent necessities of the individual and the community in primitive society. Of the two, the rite is the more stable, because while myths are constantly subject to variation to rationalize beliefs as new situations and circumstances arise, ritual remains essentially unchanged, very much as in Christianity Baptism and the Eucharist have survived all the changes in their doctrinal interpretations.

Our modern habit, however, is to look at religion from the side of belief rather than from that of rites, because down to comparatively recent times almost the only forms of religion seriously studied in Europe have been those of Christianity and Judaism, where it has been generally agreed that ritual is important only in connextion wtih its underlying doctrines. And among anthropologists, the tendency has been for attention to be concentrated on trying to explain beliefs by hypotheses as to how they may have been formed and adopted. It was not until Robertson Smith and Loisy at the end of the last century reversed the order that the significance of ritual became recognized. Now it is generally agreed that in primitive society it is the sacred actions performed that are all-important inasmuch as it is by the due performance of the prescribed cultus that sacred power is made operative.

Nevertheless, since the spoken word is thought to exercise sacred power by its utterance and repetition, it gives efficacy to the actions performed and the episodes recounted as an 'uttered rite'. Emotional situations of continual recurrence require perpetual satisfaction, and around certain fundamental themes, such as the creation of the world, the loss of immortality, the destiny of man, and the sequence of the seasons, a sacred narrative has developed in which the providential ordering and sustaining of all things are affirmed, and power is liberated to enable man to overcome his disabilities and shortcomings through the magic of the sacred word. The stories told and repeated with regular precision, usually at certain seasons by raconteurs who have a vested interest in them and their recitation, relate to events of outstanding importance which have a permanent significance for the moral, social and religious organization of society. They are not concerned with purely theoretical questions or metaphysical speculations about the ultimate beginnings of things, and they draw only to a very limited extent, if at all, upon matters of purely scientific and historical interest. Although primitive people are perfectly capable of accurate observation and of empirical knowledge about secular affairs, they are neither scientists, philosophers nor neurotics, but just plain

unsophisticated practical persons living under precarious and perplexing conditions with which they endeavour to cope by both natural and supernatural means. Their interest in the past is confined to the bearing of former events on present happenings, and when this becomes articulate in myth it is in the belief that the spoken word is a sacred oracle the repetition of which sets free the creative and recreative power with which it is replete.

What happened in the brave days of old and at the creation of the world (or that part of it with which they are acquainted) is of practical importance because it is believed to have a ritual efficacy and a permanent influence on subsequent behaviour, and on the whole structure of society. Among the native tribes of Australia, for instance, a number of initiated males are set apart for the purpose of acting as custodians of tribal tradition, its ritual and sacred sites. It is their business to safeguard the transmission of this lore and to see that everything that was prescribed by the heroes and ancestors in the Dream Time of long ago (the Alcheringa) is carried out precisely as it was then ordained.

In describing the paths along which the ancestors are supposed to have travelled, and locating the places at which they halted to perform ceremonies, the sacredness of the existing totemic centres is affirmed and established for all time. Moreover, not only does this mythological topography confirm the faith respecting the things done at the cult-centres, but it links the group with its tribal territory and provides intertribal common routes leading to the water-holes and the various sacred sites which have to be visited from time to time. As long as the course followed corresponds to that taken by the ancestors, the same protection and hospitality are afforded as they were to the medieval pilgrims in Europe on their journey along the very ancient sacred ways that led to Santiago de Compostela near the Galician coast of Spain; itself a megalithic site having sacred associations going back behind the adventures of the son of Zebedee to the Bronze Age.

This is an instance of how sacred lore and its rites have become a consolidating force in society. The things done at the threshold of creation live on as a unifying dynamic in the present day by the continual repetition of the mythical events in the duly authorized ritual. Thus, the creative period is an ever-present reality, and the things done therein are re-enacted in the traditional ceremonial and re-told in sacred lore. By grounding the established order in a mythological supernatural reality, stability is given to the social structure and religious organization, and an adequate reason is provided for the things done and believed. The function of myth, in short, is to stabilize the existing régime, to afford infallible precedents for practice and procedure, and to place on an unassailable foundation the general rules of conduct, tribal institutions and the sentiments controlling social and religious behaviour.

In the words of the late Professor Malinowski, 'myth as it exists in a savage community, that is, in its living primitive form, is not merely a tale told but a reality lived. It is not in the nature of fiction such as we read to-day in a novel but it is a living reality, believed to have once happened in primeval times, and continuing ever since to influence the world and human destinies. This myth is to the savage what to a fully believing Christian is the Biblical story of Creation, of the Fall of Man, and of Redemption by Christ's sacrifice on the Cross.' It is not an explanation in satisfaction of a scientific interest, but 'a narrative resurrection of a primeval reality, told in satisfaction of deep religious wants, moral cravings, social submissions, assertions, even practical requirements. Myth fulfils in primitive culture an undispensable function: it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man.'[7] As Marett says, 'myth is not aetiological but fidejussive. Its business is not to satisfy curiosity but to confirm faith. It is here to cater, not for the speculative man with his "Why", but for the practical man with his "How if not thus?".'[8]

Therefore, so long as the established order is maintained, myth and ritual react on one another and together consolidate the religious organization and the existing social order. Indeed, through the greater part of the history of mankind society has been ordered in accordance with and unified by these sacred sanctions of which religion has been the custodian and the stabilizing dynamic. Studied alive in their natural environment in primitive society, they are integral elements in a living culture arising directly out of the social, economic, ethical and religious tradition, regarded as a 'primeval reality'. Primitive people certainly are not so completely dominated by a mystical mentality that they are incapable of adopting a rational attitude to their natural environment, as Lévy-Bruhl has supposed. On the contrary they live, like until recently most other human beings, in two domains; the one secular or 'profane', and the other sacred or 'mystical'. Consequently, they engage in both secular pursuits and in spiritual exercises and techniques.

Thus, although the Melanesians in the Trobriand Archipelago to the north-east of New Guinea regard magic as absolutely indispensable to the welfare of their gardens, they are fully aware that there are natural conditions and causes which can only be controlled by physical and mental effort. As Malinowski discovered during his residence among them, their 'knowledge is limited, no doubt, but as far as it goes it is sound and proof against mysticism. If the fences are broken down, if the seed is destroyed or has been dried or washed away, they will have recourse not to magic, but to work, guided by knowledge and reason. Their knowledge has

[7] *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (1926), pp. 21, 23.
[8] *Faith, Hope and Charity in Primitive Religion* (Oxford, 1932), p. 106.

taught them also, on the other hand, that in spite of all their forethought and beyond all their efforts there are agencies and forces which one year can bestow unwonted and unearned benefits of fertility, making everything run smooth and well, rain and sun appear at the right moment, noxious insects remain in abeyance, the harvest yields a superabundant crop; and another year again the same agencies bring ill-luck, and bad chance pursue them from beginning till end and thwart all their most strenuous efforts and their best-founded knowledge. To control these influences and these alone, they employ magic.'[9]

It is the existence of these two spheres, the sacred and the secular, the supernatural and the natural, that gives religion its essential function in maintaining in primitive society a harmonious and efficacious relationship between the two domains. The biological and social needs as necessary conditions of human existence—food, children, protection, cohesion in an integrated community—are essential requirements, and around them sacredness and dependence on powers and forces superior to man and controlling his natural environment and social order have found expression in an organized cultus that lies at the very heart of his existence. Once, however, the ultimate reality on which the discipline rests is invalidated, or in any way rendered ineffective so that the relationship between the sacred and the secular is dislocated or destroyed, the whole edifice is liable to collapse. Myth then degenerates into fiction and ritual into conventional ceremonies which, though they may be quaint and picturesque, in becoming meaningless are always liable to degenerate into unedifying superstitions like palmistry, crystal gazing and beliefs about 'luck', because they have ceased to be an integral part of a living culture.

It is this process of disintegration that now confronts the modern world in all directions, living as we are at a time when everywhere established institutions, theologies, ideologies and régimes are breaking up under the pressure of current events. To take the place of the realities of the sacred order, a new kind of mythology and cultus directed to political and economic ends has arisen to give stability to the Totalitarian State in its various forms. With the growing secularization of society since the sixteenth century, the sacred sanctions of religion have lost their cohesive efficacy in ever increasing measure, first in Western Christendom, then in the new industrialized civilization, and now even among peoples in a primitive state of culture. This has left, or is leaving, a dangerous vacuum.

Viewing the situation from the standpoint of an anthropologist, and incidentally as a professed agnostic who, as he avowed, was unable to accept any revealed religion, the late Professor Malinowski did not hesitate to affirm, both in private conversation and in public utterance, as, for example, in his Riddell Lectures at Durham in 1935, that 'a sound social

[9] Malinowski, in *Science, Religion and Reality* (1926), pp. 30f.

life must be based upon a truly religious system of values, that is, one which reflects the revelation to us of the existence of spiritual and moral order. This does not mean,' he said, 'that all the members of the society controlled by religious belief and ethics should be bigoted sectarians, or even practising believers.' But it does mean, he declared, 'the application of ethical principles and the recognition of spiritual values in public life and national policy.' If civilization and culture are to be preserved intact and enabled to fulfil their function for the common weal, 'the eternal truths of religion, he contended, must be maintained because it is they which have guided mankind out of barbarism to culture, and the loss of which seems to threaten us with barbarism again.'[10] This I am myself personally convinced is the conclusion to which an objective investigation of the anthropological evidence leads in respect of the integration of the sacred to the secular in primitive religion.

THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR IN THE BIBLE

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The subject allotted to me is the Sacred and the Secular in the Bible, a very wide and general topic. If this discussion is to be at all profitable, making something more than an inconclusive contribution to a conference such as this, it is necessary to indicate at the outset what, roughly, I take the title to mean. This not in order to launch a philosophical discussion into the meanings of 'sacred' and 'secular', following the methods of contemporary philosophers, but merely to provide some definitions to guide and control the discussion.

One of the definitions of 'sacred' in the Oxford Dictionary is 'dedicated, set apart, hence entitled to veneration or religious respect'. The word 'secular' is said to mean 'of or pertaining to the world'. (When applied to clergy it means those living in the world and not in monastic seclusion—i.e. all Modern Churchmen!) In other words, the realm of the secular is the sphere of the things of this world and its affairs, as distinguished from the affairs of religion and the Church. Thus the question we are asked to consider is this: what, according to the Bible, are the persons or things entitled to religious respect and veneration, and what has the Bible to say about those affairs of the world which are not sacred but profane?

Although there is no need here to define 'Bible', some remarks of a general nature are necessary on this topic, if only adequately to signpost the discussion. Whereas quite clearly the Bible is one book, it is also a

[10] *The Foundations of Faith and Morals* (Oxford, 1936), pp. viiiff., 62.

collection of books, a library of religious writings which we are accustomed to divide into the Old and New Testaments. Of the Old Testament we may say, following G. F. Moore, that it consists of a collection of books, 'many of which are themselves collections of writings by different authors, or compilations from earlier sources; a national religious literature of widely varying character, covering many centuries, by many hands, and reflecting not merely different situations and circumstances in the life of the nation and the mind and temperament of individual authors, but successive stages in the development of the religion itself.'[1] Suitably qualified, this statement could apply equally to the New Testament. It has become customary to refer to the writings of the Bible as 'the scripture' or 'The Holy Scriptures', 'by this character separated from all other writings'.[2] Phrases such as 'the scripture says' or 'the scriptures teach' reflect the sense of the unity of the Bible. It is possible, however, to exaggerate this unity. 'Biblical theology' is a fashionable term nowadays which seems to suggest that a unified, comprehensive and systematic theology binds all Scripture together. Unfortunately this idea of a single specific theology reflected throughout the Bible is a fiction. As might be expected in a book containing literary material drawn from such diverse sources, the Bible contains not one theology but several; or more precisely, it contains the raw material from which we may attempt to reconstruct several slightly different theologies, each bearing a family resemblance to the others. If this is so, one cannot strictly discuss 'the sacred and the secular in the Bible'. One can only review the evidence which suggests the different attitudes towards 'the sacred and the secular', as variously conceived, adopted throughout the long historical period covered by the biblical documents. Clearly in a paper of this nature one cannot hope to embark upon so rigorous and exhaustive an investigation. The scope of the discussion must therefore be drastically curtailed. The sacred and the secular must be discussed in relation to what is considered to be the dominant and recurring themes of the Old and New Testaments. The Bible says many things, but it lays particular stress and emphasis on some things more than others.

Discussion must begin with the Old Testament. At this point, further remarks of a general nature are necessary. Whereas the writings of the Old Testament constitute a major source for reconstructing the whole religion and history of Israel, it would be conceded that most of the Old Testament material has been shaped and written under the influence of the greatest religious and spiritual movement in Israel—the work and teaching of the prophets. I do not want to suggest that the post-exilic religious leaders in Israel successfully assimilated the prophetic teaching, but at least they attempted to uphold the prophetic ideals. And since most

[1] G. F. Moore: *Judaism* (1950), Vol. 1, p. 358.
[2] ibid. Vol. 1., p. 240.

of the Old Testament material was edited and revised at a time when the religion of Israel was, to a greater or lesser degree, guided by the prophetic ideals, what is most characteristic of the Old Testament is that which charterizes that stage of Israelite religion about which the Old Testament has most to say—the prophetic and immediate post-prophetic period. A general question then about the sacred and the secular in the Old Testament becomes a question about the attitude to these matters at this particular stage in Israelite history.

The second point is this. In discussing this question of the Old Testament view of the sacred and secular, we would be unwise to approach this task in the conviction that on this, as on all other topics, the Old Testament has something to say which is absolutely unique and distinct, in the sense that nothing approaching Old Testament religious insights is to be discovered amongst other religions, 'primitive' or otherwise. It has been claimed that the religion of Israel was 'utterly different from that of its environment' and that its distinctive elements appeared suddenly and can only be explained as a new creation.[3] Against this view it is possible to suggest that it is not the existence of religious factors which are absolutely distinctive of Hebrew religion, in the sense that they are not found anywhere outside Palestine, which accounts for the uniqueness of Hebrew religion, but the particular and rare combination of these factors over a relatively long period in Hebrew religious experience. This point may be illustrated by one of many possible examples. It has been claimed that Jewish monotheism is a distinctive and unique product of Jewish religious genius.[4] Apart from monotheistic beliefs found in relatively advanced cultures, e.g. that of Iknaton in Egypt, anthropological studies have revealed the existence of such beliefs in a wide variety of 'primitive' cultures. Schmidt[5] was so impressed with this evidence that he postulated the (surely mistaken) view that there existed at the threshold of religion a fully-fledged set of monotheistic beliefs, and that subsequent religious expressions represent a retrogression from this original state of high monotheism. Monotheism is thus not distinctive of the Old Testament: what is distinctive of the Old Testament is not the belief in a one personal God but the intensity and persistence with which this belief has been held, and the deep religious insights with which the Jew has illuminated the nature of the one God in whom he believed. In primitive societies, on the other hand, the all-powerful creator god remains very much in the background of the religion. In the Old Testament the stage is always dominated by its central figure, Yahweh, the god of Israel.

It is now possible to deal with the subject itself. On our chosen

[3] G. Ernest Wright: *The Old Testament Against Its Environment.* S.C.M. 1950, p. 16 ff.

[4] ibid., especially Chapter 1.

[5] Schmidt: *Origin and Growth of Religion* (1931), p. 150.

definition of the 'sacred', what is, in the Old Testament view, most entitled to veneration and religious respect? Unquestionably it is Yahweh, the Holy One of Israel. This is the characteristic and unmistakable note of the Old Testament. Admittedly, this is not the only view of deity found in the Old Testament, and few would care to agree with the ultra orthodox that the Israelites worshipped Yahweh the Holy One of Israel from the time of Abraham onwards. Nevertheless, what is distinctive of Jewish religion is this monotheistic belief in the one God, in the soleness of God. This of course is no metaphysical doctrine nor the result of metaphysical speculations. The Old Testament contains no arguments or proofs, in the strict sense, for the existence of God. God's existence is a conviction based on religious experience. God is essentially one, the creator of the heavens and the earth, and all things in them. 'Thus saith God the Lord, he that created the heavens, and stretched them forth; he that spread abroad the earth and that which cometh out of it.'[6] This theme has inspired some of the finest passages in Hebrew poetry.[7] The supreme creator is omnipotent. Here again omnipotence is not so much an abstract attribute of God or the confession of it a philosophical proposition as the expression of the assurance, particularly for the prophets, that nothing can withstand God's judgment. God is only limited by his will, and he exercises his power wisely and justly, never arbitrarily.

What is God's nature? First and foremost He is the Holy God. 'I am God, and not man; the Holy One in the midst of thee',[8] paraphrased by Snaith,[9] 'I am El, not man; *qadosh* (adjective) in thy midst', i.e. 'Yahweh is the El, the general Semitic name for the High God, the great Deity who is supreme over all and distinct from all lower gods and lesser spirits'.[10] He is God not man, that is, He is transcendent, where transcendence does not mean remoteness but otherness. And although *qodesh* (holiness) had for the early Hebrews a primitive meaning akin to mana, i.e. something semi-material which, originating in deity, was at once both dangerous and deadly and beneficient and life-giving, in prophetic thought at its best it merges with the idea of the 'numinous' as described by Otto in his 'Idea of the Holy', with its elements of Awfulness, Overpoweringness, Urgency, Wholly Other and Fascination.

'Men see the holiness of Yahweh by the exhaltation of righteousness in their midst'.[11] Righteousness (*sedeq*) is another great quality of God. *Sedeq* does not mean justice in general or the abstract idea of righteousness. It refers to concrete acts which can be seen, recognized and known,

[6] Is. 42.5. This and subsequent quotations are from the RV.
[7] Job 26:7-14, 38; Ps. 19:1-7; Prov. 8:22-31.
[8] Hosea 11:9.
[9] Snaith: *The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament* (1944), p. 47.
[10] ibid., p. 47.
[11] ibid., p. 53.

and these acts reflect the standard by which God governs the world, the way His purpose for individual men and for mankind is fulfilled. And according to the prophets these acts which manifest God's righteousness have a particular bias towards the needs of the widow, the orphan, the poor, the needy, that is to say, the weaker and unprotected elements in society. In this there is undoubtedly a strong ethical element, but the prophetic conception of what constitutes righteous acts is based essentially on insight into the nature of God and is not the result of inference or deduction from abstract ethical principles.

Thus God is holy and righteous; He is also the God of mercy, of loving kindness. There are two aspects to this love. God's love 'aheb' for man has expressed itself in the creation of man in God's image. But according to the Jew, God had a special love for Israel, for he deliberately chose the nation, 'and them only did He know out of all the families of the earth'.[12] This choice was the ground of the Covenant between Yahweh and Israel, and was the expression of God's *chesed* towards Israel. Thus while on the one hand we have God's *chesed*, strong, purposeful, and steadfast love towards Israel, the other partner must show *chesed* towards Yahweh. The nature of Israel's *chesed* towards Yahweh is best indicated by its opposite. Hosea[13] states that where he finds no *chesed* towards Yahweh, there is found 'swearing and breaking of faith and killing and stealing and committing adultery; they break out and blood toucheth blood.' Lack of *chesed* also shows itself in idolatry and apostasy. In Snaith's words, 'Israel's true *chesed* involves therefore primarily knowledge of God and issues from that loyalty in true and proper worship together with proper behaviour in respect of the humanitarian virtues.'[14] Thus with *chesed*, as with *sedeq*, the state of affairs created by it is known by the presence of concrete acts.

Not only does the Old Testament declare that God is holy, merciful and righteous, but He is also the God of Salvation. The conception of Salvation is dominant throughout the Old Testament. God's righteousness reveals itself in His saving work. His will is to vindicate the right. He does this with particular reference to the righteous poor, a phrase which later comes to stand for the godly humble remnant of Israel who have conformed to the norm which God has established for His obedient servants. This norm is to be established here on earth, for the Old Testament has little emphasis on life beyond the grave, except in the writings dating from the second century B.C. onwards. And the creation on earth of God's righteousness, which is His salvation, involves the blessings of honour from men, and general prosperity for men. It is actual concrete things like long life, wealth, happiness and general prosperity which mark

[12] Amos, 3:2.
[13] Hosea, 4:2.
[14] ibid., p. 102.

men who are obedient to the will of Yahweh and thus by their obedience further the establishment of Yahweh's righteousness on earth.

Space does not permit one to enlarge here on the Hebrew conception of the man who is particularly successful in his obedience to Yahweh—men whom the Israelites regarded as being especially possessed by the spirit of Yahweh, *ruah adonai*; that more than human power, strength and vigour in life which is God's and from God, and which possessed the prophets to a marked degree.

The realm of the sacred then in the Old Testament covers all those activities of man which actively further the establishment of God's righteousness on earth. And by the same token the profane or the sinful is that which thwarts His purpose, that is to say, those actions which arise, according to the Old Testament, from rebellion against God in the heart of man, the refusal to acknowledge Yahweh as God. Thus in the Old Testament sin is predominantly a religious term, since it is based on the conception of thwarting God's will, although sinful actions are also frequently actions we would describe as morally and ethically wrong. Since the Old Testament discusses God's nature in terms of His righteousness, mercy and holiness, the specific actions required of man in obedience to God are generally moral actions—care for the weaker elements in society, refraining from swearing, lying and all forms of deceit. But the realm of the sacred is not confined entirely to the moral and ethical spheres. Religion in the Old Testament is never solely a moral relation between God and man; it is never 'morality tinged with emotion'. Obedience to God is also to be expressed through worship, and worship demands a ritualistic and cultic organization of various degrees of elaboration. Religion can hardly exist without its ritual and ceremonial side, for how else may expression be given to the religiously felt need for collective corporate worship of God? In this the Old Testament is no exception. For the late post-exilic period the Old Testament provides fairly abundant evidence from which may be reconstructed the elaborate ritual and ceremonial arrangements of the worship of the Second Temple. In this period it is quite clear that obedience to God's will demanded more than good behaviour and conduct. Strict observance of the ritual and ceremonial laws is enjoined side by side with the ethical injunctions. Indeed, the distinction between ethical and ritual sin is unknown. It is as much a sin against God to commit ritual transgressions such as breaking the prohibition to eat pork or failing to observe the ritual of purification of the leper[15] as it is to commit moral sins such as incest, homicide or robbery. The realm of the sacred extends in the Old Testament beyond the ethical sphere to cover the ritually clean and unclean. As Moore maintains, 'piety expresses itself in scrupulous conformity to the observances

[15] Lev. 19:19 and Lev. 14 respectively.

of religion as well as to what we call its moral injunctions and prohibitions.'[16] The motives and origin of these ritual injunctions were diverse. Nevertheless, unless one has understood the part they played in the complex web of Jewish religious observances, one has not begun to understand Jewish religion. Neither will it do to huddle them under the name 'taboos'. As Moore says, 'To huddle them all together under the title "ancient taboos" is to deceive one's self with the imagination that when one has put a label—preferably a jargon label—on a phenomenon he has explained it, or dispensed himself from the necessity of understanding it.' The jargon of anthropologists is getting to be as portentous as that of the mediaeval alchemists, with this difference, that the alchemists' jargon was for the mystification of outsiders, while the anthropologists mystify not only the unlearned but themselves unawares with their Totem, Mana, Taboo, and the rest.[17]

The prophets, admittedly, violently denounced the elaboration and corruption by the fusion with it of alien elements, of the cult of their day. But it is a difficult matter to argue that they denounced all ritual observances whatsoever. Hosea regards it as a great calamity that 'the children of Israel shall be many days without king, without princes, without sacrifice and without pillar, and without ephod and teaphim.'[18] Amos is admittedly the most uncompromising of all in his denunciation of the ritual,[19] although it is possible to argue that he denounced the ritual of his day because it had so degenerated since Israel's days in the Wilderness. In any case the prophets denounced not so much ritual itself but the attention paid to ritual and ceremonial to the exclusion of right action. In this their protest remains ever valid. It would, however, be difficult to trace a period in the long history of Israel when the realm of the sacred did not apply equally to ritual and cultic spheres as to the strictly ethical and moral.

It is necessary now to turn to consideration of the 'secular' in the Old Testament. Attention was directed at the outset to one of the definitions of 'secular'—i.e. pertaining to the affairs of the world. When it is said that life in England has been secularized, we mean that vast areas of social activity have, for better or worse, passed outside religious or clerical control, and have become completely independent of ecclesiastical organizations. In education, the universities and schools have for the most part ceased to be ecclesiastical institutions. In the sphere of law, the supreme and sovereign legislative body is almost entirely a secular body.[20] The

[16] Moore, *op. cit.* Vol. II, p. 14.
[17] ibid., p. 22.
[18] Hosea 3:4.
[19] Amos, 5:25.
[20] Strictly speaking, the supreme legislative authority in Great Britain is the Queen in Parliament, and the House of Lords does contain the Lords Spiritual.

political organizations in the country are thoroughly secular, and no one would wish to argue that the economic direction of the country is at all under religious control or influence. None of this was true of the Israelite state, at least for those periods of its history for which the Old Testament provides evidence. From the Old Testament we gain the definite impression that the Israelites did not recognize this distinction between the secular and the sacred. 'Religion in Israel was not a sphere apart dividing life with the secular.'[21] It may be argued that the Old Testament, as a body of religious literature, supplies only one-sided evidence in this matter. But there is reason to suppose that the Israelite society differed little in this respect from that of its neighbours, where the available evidence reveals the absence of this modern distinction between the sacred and the secular. In the case of the Old Testament, Israelite Law, including criminal and ceremonial law, is regarded as divinely revealed to Moses by Yahweh on Mt. Sinai; which reminds us of the scene of Hammurabi receiving the laws from his god which heads the slab of black diorite on which the code of Hammurabi is inscribed. In both societies, the whole corpus of law governing the society was regarded as religious law, backed by religious sanctions. Turning to political arrangements, it is difficult to trace the precise relations between Israelite religion and the forms of political organization in the pre-exilic period. Nevertheless, it is possible to maintain that in Israel, as amongst her neighbours, the early kings of Israel were central figures in the ritual and ceremonial practices of the nation, and were thus as much religious as political figures.[22] Certainly in the post-exilic period the Old Testament witnesses to the experiment of setting up a theocracy in Israel when the political organization was completely dominated by a religious ideology. Similarly, the distinction between the natural and the supernatural is absent from the Old Testament. Since God is the creator, His power is conceived as exercised directly in nature; forces of nature acting as secondary causes and the laws of nature according to which these forces operate have no place in the native religious thought of the Jews. In so far as the Jew had noted and reflected at all upon the regularity of nature, this was for him the ordinary way of God's working. 'Of the uniformity of nature, the postulate of modern science—"a question begged at the outset"—no anticipation entered their minds.'[23] God, being omnipotent, was of course free to act in an extraordinary way, if He saw occasion for it, as in His ordinary way; with this

[21] Moore: *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 461.

[22] For discussion of this topic vide A. R. Johnson, 'The Role of the King in the Jerusalem Cultus' in The Labyrinth: ed. Hooke 1935, p. 71. f. and the same author's Sacral Kingship in Ancient Israel (1955). For recent discussion vide, L. S. McCullough: Israel's Kigs, Sacral or Otherwise and A. R. Johnson: Old Testament Exegesis, Imaginative and Unimaginative in Nos 5 and 6 respectively of Vol. lxviii of the *Expository Times.*

[23] Moore, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 376.

view of nature, the one was as natural as the other. The contrast we make between the natural and the supernatural did not exist; all events were equally the immediate work of God. In this the Hebrew attitude seems akin to that found in other 'pre-scientific' societies, where the unusual occurrence in nature is ascribed to the agency of God and where no radical distinction is drawn between the natural order on the one hand and the social order on the other. For instance, the distinguished anthropologist, Radcliffe-Brown, states that amongst certain Australian tribes personification of natural phenomena and of natural species is common. 'The function of this process of personification is that it permits nature to be thought of as if it were a society of persons, and so makes of it a social or moral order.'[24] The totemic rites—e.g. the rite at a rain totem centre which is believed to bring rain in its due season—imply 'a religious conception of the place of man in the universe . . . while for us the order of nature is one thing and the social order another, for the Australian they are two parts of a single order.'[25] Turning to the more advanced urban cultures of Egypt and Mesopotamia it is found that, according to Frankfort, 'two correlated facts become apparent. In the first place, we find that speculation found unlimited possibilities for development; it was not restricted by a scientific (that is to say disciplined) search for truth. In the second place, we notice that the realm of nature and are realm of man were not distinguished.'[26] Frankfort continues: 'The fundamental difference between the attitudes of modern and ancient man as regards the surrounding world is this; for modern, sceintific man the phenomenal world is primarily an "It"; for ancient, and also for primitive man, it is a "thou".[27]

In citing these two examples, I do not wish to suggest either that the society reflected in the Old Testament was predominantly totemic in character; in fact the evidence cited in favour of the view that the Israelite society was at one stage of its development totemic is slight, and the view itself may rest on disputable assumptions[28]: or that Frankfort is right in describing the mythology of the Near East as 'reflecting the logic of mythopoeic thought', from which the Hebrews were the first to break away.[29] I merely want to suggest that the absence from the Old Testament of the radical distinction between the natural and social orders is not unique, for this is true of other pre-scientific societies, and is to be explained, not necessarily in terms of a special kind of pre-logical mentality,

[24] A. R. Radcliffe-Brown: *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (1952), p. 131.

[25] ibid., p. 167.

[26] Ed. Frankfort: *Before Philosophy*. Pelican 1949, p. 12.

[27] ibid., p. 12.

[28] The evidence is discussed in Oesterley & Robinson: *Hebrew Religion, Its Origin ad Devlopment* (1930), p. 489, with references to other literature. The assumptions of the book have been widely challenged, particularly Snaith, *op. cit.*, p. 12 f.

[29] For this latter view vide Frankfort, op. cit., p. 244.

but by the absence of the ability devloped in modern society to distinguish between natural causality and other types of causality.[30]

To sum up; it is possible, I think, to contend that the Old Testament nowhere recognizes our distinction between the sacred and the secular. From the Old Testament point of view, the all important distinction is of a different order, namely, between those who obey the will of God and those who do not.

What of the sacred and secular in the New Testament? I have purposely confined most of my remarks to the Old Testament, since it would be agreed that what is true of that work is substantially true of a collection books which, although written in Greek, so much reflects the Hebrew idiom and contents of the Old Testament. Admittedly in the New Testament the realm of the sacred does not precisely coincide with what is found in the Old Testament, for the New Testament teaching about God, being based on the supreme revelation of Him in the life and ministry of Jesus, is different. As Professor James has said, 'Christ made a genuine departure from the accepted belief of Judaism in his insistence on the constraining love of God in seeking the sinful and giving them a place in His Kingdom, not of right or merit but solely as an act of grace.'[31] Moreover, the core of the New Testament is the 'seal placed upon the teaching of Jesus by His actual act of self-renunciation on the Cross which for Christians is the supreme revelation of the love of God at the very heart of the Universe.'[32] Thus New Testament theology, particularly Pauline, regards Christ as the head of a new humanity and a new world order, 'the Church becoming a transforming leaven reviewing a dying age by offering the power of God in justification and sanctification through the redemptive relationship Christ has established between God and man.'[33] In principle this new world order to which Christians belong is all embracing, claiming universal jurisdiction over all human activities, although within this broad framework there is abundant scope for independent human activities of the kind which we call secular. Thus the New Testament, like the Old Testament, denies any real distinction between the secular and the sacred. The distinction lies rather between the God who transends the natural and the historic order and the God who is imminent in the world, the link between the two being the Divine Person of Jesus through whom the temporal becomes the channel of the eternal. Thus 'Christian civilization was built up on a tension of dualities in a pluralistic society unified by the underlying conviction that it was God

[30] This point is argued by S. N. Kramer in his 'Sumerian Theology and Ethics', *Havard Theological Review*, Vol. xlix, No. 1, p. 45, footnote 1.

[31] E. O. James: *The Concept of Deity* (1950), p. 156.

[32] ibid., p. 156.

[33] ibid., p. 161.

who transcended all things in a world in which He was working out His purposes in a realm of ends.'[34]

If I understand it aright, the task of this conference is to discover means of reinstating that single unified religious view of the world which dominates both Old and New Testaments, and restoring, in a society fragmentized and compartmentalized as ours is, that true tension between the Infinite and the Finite, the temporal and the eternal upon which, at the outset, Christian civilization was built.

THE MEDIAEVAL SYNTHESIS OF THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR

By the Rev. Canon D. J. B. Hawkins, D.D.

I

The subject of this paper naturally divides into two parts, the theoretical and the practical. There is the question of the relationship of theology and purely human knowledge, and there is the question of the Church in its relation to human society. Both questions were prominent in the Middle Ages, and were given solutions which are partly of their time and partly such as to leave a permanent impress on Catholic Christianity.

The question of faith and reason became important when the products of reason were imposing enough to raise a problem. In other words, it is really with the rediscovery of the works of Aristotle, considered as a kind of encyclopaedia of philosophy and the sciences, that the integration of this body of knowledge with Christian tradition became urgent. In the earlier Middle Ages, of course, although human knowledge was so little developed, there were not wanting anti-humanists like St. Peter Damiani with the perennial, if confused, argument of the world-denying temperament that the one thing necessary was the only thing desirable. The unhappy fate of Abelard shows how strong this prejudice continued to be, although we shall not judge his adversaries justly if we forget that the evidence of his own writings makes very clear that he thoroughly enjoyed putting other men's backs up and was not always capable of suffering even wise men gladly when their wisdom was of a different brand from his own. Moreover, the less edifying parts of his personal history must have contributed to arouse prejudice against him.

Nevertheless, in the generation after Abelard, it was his disciples who came to the fore; no one represents a balanced Christian humanism

[34] ibid., p. 161.

in embryo better than, say, John of Salisbury. The celebrated Anselmian formula of a faith seeking understanding came into its own, and it is worth noticing that this formula is not as trite as it sounds. For the best intellectual effort of the Middle Ages came from the urge of Christian men to understand, as far as might be, what they believed. Theirs was different from the modern problem, as many men see it now, of asking how much theology will fit in with an established body of science. There will be more to say of this shortly.

Let us place ourselves in the thirteenth century with the traditional theology and Aristotle face to face. That there were difficulties before the baptism of Aristotle we all know, but what is heartening is that they were so comparatively easily overcome; the mediaeval Church adapted itself to the new outlook with an inspiring vitality. If for the principles of synthesis we refer mainly to St. Thomas Aquinas, it is not only because St. Thomas is the most famous and most accredited of mediaeval thinkers; it is also because this kind of broad view really shows him at his best.

It would be a mistake to identify St. Thomas's own systematic conception of the relationship of the various branches of knowledge with that which in a different intellectual climate became and still remains characteristic of scholastic writing. In more recent centuries, in conflict with deists, rationalists and what not, those who remained faithful to the scholastic tradition developed a scheme which was built from the bottom upwards. Philosophy, beginning with logic and theory of knowledge, and proceeding through a general metaphysic and a metaphysic of nature and man, arrived on grounds of universal reason at a conception of God and of the natural moral order. Apologetics or fundamental theology formulated the approach to the work of God in history, the grounds of belief in the Christian revelation and the Christian Church. Theology proper was left with the task of systematic exposition of the contents of revelation.

St. Thomas and the other thinkers of the thirteenth century had different preoccupations. There is very little that corresponds with the modern notion of apologetics in St. Thomas. This is partly, no doubt, because the mediaevals had no sufficient knowledge of history to develop this side of Christian thought, but it was also because, being good Aristotelians, they did not think of history as a science. When faced with Jewish or Mohammedan opposition, St. Thomas was chiefly concerned to try to exhibit the greater rationality of Christian beliefs; this may be seen all through the *Summa Contra Gentiles*.

Fundamentally, St. Thomas, with the other mediaeval theologians, thought that the supernatural character of the Christian revelation had been made sufficiently obvious to those who were offered the grace of faith to discern it. But this sort of assent, presupposing the divine gift of a power to think in some measure on the divine level, was plainly different

from the assent given to scientific knowledge or even to human testimony and could not be reduced to it without losing its proper character. Hence St. Thomas's answer to the perennial difficulty that a man either has sufficient rational ground to believe or not. If he has, then what is all this talk about a divine gift of faith and man's power to accept or refuse it? If he has not, on the other hand, he would seem to be rash to believe at all.

St. Thomas replies that a man has sufficient ground for believing, for the authority of revelation is supported by supernatural signs and, what is more, by the internal call of God himself (*interiori instinctu Dei invitantis*). But this cannot be equated with knowing in a scientific way; hence it remains a matter of free personal response to a divine invitation, which is a first stage on the path to the beatific vision.[1] Faith must always be seen not simply as an addition to speculative knowledge but in the practical line of man's journey to God.

Moreover, St. Thomas did not forget that the majority of men are not exact thinkers. He rated the achievements of the Greek philosophers, and especially of Aristotle, as high as he could, but the partial truth attained by a few exceptional men after much difficulty was not a solution of the needs of mankind in general. Mankind in general needs the authoritative guidance of Christ and His Church.

The truth of the Christian religion, therefore, rested on its own evidence apart from the systematic constructions of human science. But it came into contact with the human sciences in so far as it was itself made a subject of systematic reflection, in so far, that is, as there developed a *sacra doctrina* or theology. St. Thomas had no doubt that this was a legitimate development. When he asks whether the application of reason diminishes the merit of faith, he replies in effect that it would do so if you tried to convert Christianity into a pure philosophy and to accept only what you could prove on philosophical grounds but that, given the fundamental acceptance of faith, the more clearly you think out what you believe the better you are doing.[2] So also *sacra doctrina est argumentativa*; it accepts its foundations from divine revelation, but its elaboration is the work of human reason.[3] And, in the mediaeval systematization of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the gifts of understanding and of knowledge were a development and enhancement of faith.

In working out a scientific theology St. Thomas, as everyone knows, gave a very large scope to philosophical reason. He held that some Christian truths, such as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, were susceptible of philosophical demonstration. Others, like the Trinity,

[1]Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas: *Summa Theologica* IIa IIae qu. 2 art. 9 ad 3.
[2]Cf. op. cit. IIa IIae qu. 2 art. 10.
[3]Cf. op cit. Ia qu. 1 art. 8.

were accessible to faith alone, but could be in some degree explained and illustrated by philosophical considerations. From a modern standpoint, the former would be said to belong to philosophy and the latter to theology proper. For St. Thomas and the mediaevals they all belonged to a theological synthesis which was a reflection on the whole of the Christian outlook and incorporated all the philosophy which was relevant to this. That is why St. Thomas wrote a *Summa Theologica* which is full of philosophy but wrote no *summa philosophica*.

Of course it has been questioned whether St. Thomas did not make too light of the task of harmonizing Aristotle with Christianity. A few years ago, for example, Dr. H. V. Jaffa devoted a book on *Thomism and Aristotelianism*[4] to a study of St. Thomas's commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and to pointing out what he held to be non-Aristotelian principles which St. Thomas tacitly assumed in his exposition. These were:

'1. Belief in divine particular providence.
2. Belief that perfect happiness is impossible in this life.
3. Belief in the necessity of personal immortality to complete the happiness intended, evidently, by nature.
4. Belief in personal immortality.
5. Belief in the special creation of individual souls.
6. Belief in a divinely implanted "natural" habit of the moral principles.'[5]

Any student of Aristotle will at once admit that these principles are not Aristotelian. Yet, if we confronted St. Thomas with this, it is very easy to imagine his answer. 'So much the worse for Aristotle is that case,' he might say. 'At any rate, I think philosophy can go as far as that.'

It is not our business, however, to discuss the merits of St. Thomas's philosophical views in detail. The point here is that he had an impressively comprehensive ideal of a synthetic unity of theology and human knowledge, and his humanism resides in the value which he assigned to all knowledge for its own sake. If complete happiness is reserved to the life after death, nevertheless, he says, 'the study of the speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness'.[6]

The bane of admirers of the Middle Ages, and indeed of admirers of any period of the past, has been to assume that the highest ideals of the period obtained in actual fact. We must, then, hasten to admit that the Thomistic ideal of synthesis was never unquestioned. In the thirteenth century there was the opposition of the Averroists or, as Professor Van Steenberghen prefers to call them, the radical Aristotelians. On their

[4]University of Chicago Press, 1952.
[5]Op cit., p. 187.
[6]St. Thomas Aquinas: *Summa Theologica* Ia IIae qu. 3 art. 6.

reading of Aristotle and his Mohammedan commentators, the great Greek thinker appeared to say many things which were incompatible with the Christian faith, and his reasons were only too plausible. In that case it might be, as the boldest of them tended to think, that Christian dogmas had a primarily imaginative value and, if we may use a modern phrase, should be demythologized in order to arrive at literal truth. Alternatively we might have to confess that human reason is often misleading and that we should not expect as much assistance from philosophy as St. Thomas expected for the cause of the Christian faith. At such a conclusion there were plenty of conservative theologians to nod approvingly.

In the fourteenth century, the new philosophical outlook associated with William of Ockham led, with its empirical bias, to a loss of confidence in metaphysics. St. Thomas had thought himself to know laws of being which were valid even for God, because their negation would entail contradiction. If these laws were reduced to empirical generalizations, men were hardly entitled to suppose that the absolute power of God could make no exception to them. Hence there could at the same time be a tendency to a more agnostic kind of philosophy, which prepared the way for Renaissance humanism, and a tendency in theology to extol the arbitrary will of God, which prepared the way for Luther and Calvin. Dr. Gordon Leff, in his recent book on *Bradwardine and the Pelagians,*[7] has thrown valuable new light on this cleft as it appeared in the fourteenth century itself, with Bradwardine putting forward an almost Calvinist doctrine of predestination against the thinkers whom he describes as Pelagians and who include Ockham himself. So, once again, philosophy and theology began to appear as rivals instead of uniting in the kind of harmonious synthesis at which St. Thomas had aimed.

If, therefore, we are to speak of a mediaeval synthesis of the sacred and the secular in the region of speculative thought, we must acknowledge that it was historically a precarious balance and was fully attained only, perhaps, in the work of St. Thomas. But that, of course, is precisely one of the chief reasons why St. Thomas is so important. The synthetic outlook to which he gave expression is worthy of emphasis both because it was in itself a noble ideal of Christian humanism and because, when the dust of controversy settled, it left a permanent impression on Catholic Christianity. Such a synthesis has to be renewed in every age in relation to the contemporary state of theology, philosophy and the sciences, but it remains a worthy aim and has its classical exemplar in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. That is one reason why many of us, including the present writer, still call ourselves Thomists.

[7]Cambridge University Press, 1957.

II

In the social and political sphere we cannot speak of an actual mediaeval synthesis comparable with the theoretical synthesis of St. Thomas; we can speak only of efforts at synthesis and of principles of synthesis which are still relevant. If we take a Catholic view of the Church, the relations of Church and State inevitably raise problems. For, on the Catholic view, the external form of the Church is in essentials determined by Christ, so that its essential organization and powers are independent of any purely human authority. The Church, therefore, must claim to be an exception to that absolute sovereignty beloved by monarchs, democracies and every other kind of political organization. History, in any case, makes plain enough that there is a problem of Church and State.

The political philosophy of the early Middle Ages was mainly derived from St. Augustine, and Augustine's view of the state might be described, according to the standpoint of the critic, as either realistic or pessimistic. We all know his rhetorical question: 'Apart from justice, what are kingdoms but robber bands on a larger scale?'[8] Sometimes, indeed, those who quote it seem to forget the opening phrase. Augustine did, of course, recognize the necessity of the state in order to ensure some form of justice, but he did not expect from it more than a very imperfect form of justice and insisted that it took its origin in a sinful humanity and usually ministered to the passions of sinful men.

When, in the Dark Ages, the Church was dealing with Franks and Goths and Lombards, not to speak of the Anglo-Saxon kings in our own country, the Augustinian outlook on politics was not likely to be disputed. Yet the Church had to do its best, if possible to civilize, but at least partly to humanize, these bloodthirsty potentates. Moreover, the Church was at least partly successful. Mediaeval rulers began to acknowledge standards, even if they did not always live up to them, and these were standards which they had received from the Church. If the mediaeval Church and the mediaeval Papacy looked on themselves as the guardians of political standards, this was because they had in fact contributed such standards to the social life of Christendom.

While the Church at all times has a function of moral leadership which is social as well as individual, it is very easy for men, especially in the heat of controversy, to erect the ways in which this leadership is exercised at any particular time into pseudo-eternal principles. So we find enthusiastic mediaeval canonists arguing that, since the material is lower than the spiritual, temporal power must be subordinated to the spiritual power of the Church. As the soul rules the body, the Church has authority over kings and emperors. Christ, as God incarnate, had

[8] St. Augustine: *De Civitate Dei* IV 4.

power over everything in the world; the Pope, as Christ's vicar, has the same power, and temporal rulers are his delegates.

These theocratic claims were paralleled by an imperial myth, with which the ordinary reader is most familiar in one of its latest manifestations, the *Monarchia* of Dante. God had bestowed a supreme temporal authority on the Roman emperors, and this descended inalienably to Henry VII of Luxemburg and to those who would come after him. As, about the time of Dante himself, it became too obvious that the Holy Roman Emperor was in fact only a German sovereign, similar pretensions to divine right were advanced by national kings. It is significant that Henry VIII, when he assumed authority over the Church, did so on the basis that the realm of England was an empire. He was alluding not to the British Empire of the future, but to a claim to possess in England the kind of authority which mediaeval imperialists had attributed to the Emperor.

With such oppositions, it is evident that we cannot speak of a stable mediaeval synthesis of the sacred and the secular in the social and political sphere. A balanced view of the relations of Church and State came rather from Counter-Reformation theologians like Bellarmine, refuting James I's claim to divine right but vindicating for the Church only an indirect power in temporal matters, that is to say, the temporal rights which were appropriate to the fulfilment of the Church's spiritual mission. This was really a return to an earlier and more authentic Christian tradition as expressed, for example, in the words of Gelasius I and Nicholas I to the Eastern Emperors of their time.

The contribution of mediaeval thought to this eventual balance is again connected with Aristotle. The study of Aristotelian political theory made possible a more appreciative view of the state than could be found in Augustine. Some form of social organization was seen as natural to man in any circumstances and as conducive to his good through the prosecution of justice. Since the supernatural did not abolish the natural, the State was not superseded by the Church. The strongly teleological character of Aristotelian thinking provided the basis of distinction and of harmony. The primary purpose of the State was the temporal and material good of its citizens; the primary purpose of the Church was man's eternal and spiritual good. Each was autonomous in its own sphere, and each could be helpful to the other. Since there was no real conflict between the ends of both institutions, for both had their place in the divine plan for the world, there need in theory be no conflict between Church and State.

In theory, yes, but we should be accusing the mediaeval Aristotelians of undue simplicity if we thought that they had supposed themselves to settle the problem in practice. We also should be guilty of undue simplicity if we did not acknowledge that it is far more often the State which

oppresses the Church than the Church which tries to dominate the State. Behind the exaggerations of the theocratic theories of the mediaeval canonists we should be able to recognize a real effort to ensure the spiritual independence of the Christian man from any political authority. Even those who do not admit the spiritual authority claimed by men like Gregory VII, Alexander III and Innocent III can see that they stood out against naked power for the autonomy of the spiritual.

Although, therefore, in the turmoil of the Middle Ages themselves no clear solution of the relationship of political society to spiritual society emerged, mediaeval men provided an example of the struggle for the independence of the spiritual, and their thought offered a foundation for the peaceful discrimination of these two spheres. This can be set side by side with St. Thomas's intellectual ideal of Christian humanism as the mediaeval contribution to the synthesis of the sacred and the secular. The mediaeval mind entertained the idea of Christendom as a united society both fully human and fully Christian. This evocative term, Christendom, has been used only once hitherto, precisely because it is more evocative than clear, but it may serve at the last to sum up in its associations what is best and most stimulating in the mediaeval ideal.

THE RENAISSANCE, THE REFORMATION, AND AFTER

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The first act in the drama of the history of Christendom has been presented in three scenes. The motif was integration. The curtain is now being raised for the beginning of the second act, in which the disaster of disintegration occurs. It will consist of two scenes. The third and final act, the act of the dénouement, in which the plot will be unravelled, has yet to be written. To-morrow's speakers, whose theme will be reintegration, will doubtless endeavour to show how it should be written. The first act ended with an impressive spectacle: Holy Mother Church was dominating the stage. There she was in the Middle Ages, unifying men's activities and creating a wholeness which can still be apprehended by those who contemplate with imagination what Sir Walter Scott calls in *Harold the Dauntless* the 'gray towers', the 'mix'd and massive piles', and the 'venerable aisles' of Durham Cathedral, or the Vine Window at Wells, or the illuminations of a mediaeval manuscript; or by those who drink deep of that well which Robert Bridges describes as

> 'an irrefragable system
> of metaphysic, ethic and theologic truth.'

(As you know, he is speaking of Thomism.) In fine, the medium aevum was an epoch in which 'all life was saturated with religion to such an extent that the people were in constant danger of losing sight of the distinction between things spiritual and things temporal' (J. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, p. 140), which is surely 'a consummation devoutly to be wished'. Then comes the calamity of disintegration: the marriage of the sacred and the secular is dissolved. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate this calamity.

Before I embark on my task, let me say that I accept Principal Oman's definition of the sacred. In one of the most profound books of this century, he states that the sacred 'just means absoluteness of value, that which is of incomparable worth', and he explains that by 'incomparable' he means 'what may not be brought down and compared with other goods' (J. Oman, *The Natural and the Supernatural*, p. 65). The realm of the sacred, then, and the realm of Absolute Values, of those Values of Absolute Goodness, Absolute Beauty, and Absolute Truth, which, as Dr. Inge says, 'are valued not as instruments to anything else, but which stand in their own right, guaranteed by the testimony of our whole personality as being ultimately real' (W. R. Inge, *God and the Astronomers*, p. 192), are one and the same.

It is a terrifying fact that the authority of this triad of Absolute Values, which is, *ex hypothesi*, the authority of the sacred, is not merely rejected by, but no longer exists in the minds of, a large section of humanity. How and why has this disaster come to pass? I suggest that there have been two main factors in it. The first is the deification of man, which is a bastard child of the Renaissance. At its inception in the fourteenth century, the Italian Renaissance was a recovery of a lost culture; a return

> 'To the glory that was Greece
> And the grandeur that was Rome.'

It was a rebirth of humanitas, the study of litterae humanae (or litterae humaniores), the study of ancient Greek and Latin culture. It was the rediscovery of a lost world. When Keats first looked into Chapman's Homer, he felt like

> 'Some watcher of the skies
> When a new planet swims into his ken';

So must the pioneers of the Revival of Learning, men like Petrarch and Boccaccio, have felt when they rediscovered Cicero, Virgil, Plato, Homer, and the rest. Their exultation is revealed in their writings; for in the classics they found a conception of life 'freer, larger, more rational, and more joyous than the mediaeval; one which gave unfettered scope to the play of the human feelings, to the sense of beauty, and to all the activities

of the intellect' (R. C. Jebb, *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. I, p. 538). Here was the liberal, humanist ethos. Yet there was no thought in their minds of forsaking the teaching of the Church: they saw nothing in the classics which was antagonistic to Christianity. Petrarch 'advocated the study of the classics as the key to a larger mental life, not contrary to the Christian, but ancillary to it' (*ibid.*, p. 539). These men were reconcilers. As Edith Sichel says, 'they sought for knowledge as if it were the philosopher's stone, but solely on condition that thought should be made one with Christianity' (*The Renaissance*, p. 26). The same can be said of the luminaries of the palmy days of the Italian Renaissance. We think, for example, of that Maecenas, Lorenzo de' Medici, in whose palace at Florence and in whose villa at Fiesole the members of the Platonic Academy were wont to meet. We think of Ficino and Pico della Mirandola, the leaders of that same Academy. We think of the great painters and sculptors, men like Michael Angelo, the versatile Leonardo, the saintly Fra Angelico, and the sublime Botticelli. It is true that the Italian Renaissance had its dark side: some of the humanists abused their newfound liberty and were morally corrupt; but these men were not representative of the movement. On the contrary, most of the Italian humanists were men of exemplary character.

When we turn to the transalpine Renaissance, we find that although the emphasis is somewhat different, basically the picture is the same. Erasmus welcomes the rediscovery of Greek because a knowledge of it enables him to produce the first printed text of the New Testament in the tongue in which it was written. Why does he want to have the New Testament in Greek? He wishes to discover the pristine purity of New Testament Christianity. The ideals of Sir Thomas More and John Colet, who with Erasmus form the trinity known as the Oxford Reformers, are the same as those of Erasmus. Likewise the primary interests of the German humanists, for example, Reuchlin, is in the elucidation of the text of the Bible. Hear the conclusion of the whole matter: the spirit of the Renaissance was not hostile to Christianity; its creators were men inspired by, and dedicated to, the Absolute Values of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth.

As the drama proceeds, however, there are signs of a coming devolution; for 'the sense of freedom and emancipation, the thrill of discovery and widening knowledge, the new confidence in Man himself, his endowments, his gifts and his capacities, led naturally toward the conclusion that Man is master in his own universe and could mould his destiny to his own will' (F. R. Barry, *The Relevance of Christianity*, p. 111). Man became increasingly conscious of his powers and grasped at the attributes of Deity, omniscience and omnipotence. We see which way the wind is blowing when Shakespeare, himself a child of the Renaissance, puts into the mouth of Hamlet this eulogy of man: 'What a piece of work is man!

How noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving, how express and admirable! in action, how like an angel! in apprehension, how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!' Man is godlike. There is nothing beyond his powers; so he goes on questing and seeking and conquering; he discovers new realms, and modern science, science as we know it, is born. Scientia is a daughter of the Renaissance spirit, a daughter of Greece. (As H. A. L. Fisher says in the opening sentences of his *History of Europe*, we Europeans of to-day are 'children of Hellas'.) Shakespeare lived to see the dawn of the century in which modern science began. 'The modern world, so far as mental outlook is concerned, begins in the seventeenth century' (Bertrand Russell, *The History of Western Philosophy*, p. 547). The pioneers of modern science were four: Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton. (It is true that the first of the four died in the sixteenth century, but he is of the seventeenth inasmuch as his influence was not felt till about a hundred years after his death.) These four made discoveries which have shaped the lives of all who have come after them. The sum total of their hypotheses is that Nature is governed by law. Alexander Pope put it in a nutshell in a well known couplet:

> 'Nature, and Nature's Laws, lay hid in night,
> God said, Let Newton be! and all was light.'
> (*Essay on Man*)

At the same time, there was the rise of the new scientific philosophy. Francis Bacon maintained that man must be given mastery over the forces of nature by means of scientific discoveries and inventions. His method was that of the sceintist, the method of induction. He would have nothing to do with deduction, with the *a priori*. Descartes, who was a pious son of Holy Church, propounded what he called 'the first principle of the philosophy that I sought', which is summed up in his famous *Cogito, ergo sum* (Meditation II), a principle of subjectivism which has had a profound influence on the method of all subsequent philosophy. The next century, the eighteenth, was the age of rationalism; the age of David Hume, the Deists, and the Encyclopaedists. The supremacy of human reason was the dominant theme. Man's reason can lead him into all truth; it can build Utopia. In the latter part of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the next we have the Romantic Movement, of which the prophets are men like Rousseau, Shelley, Byron, and Wordsworth, a fundamental article of whose creed is that man is naturally good, and that if he is left to work out his own destiny unfettered, the Golden Age will arrive. Came the Victorian era, which brought Lyell, Darwin, Spencer, and Thomas Huxley. Their hypotheses gave the complacent theologians some rude shocks. The reign of the concept of evolution had begun. The effect of the new theories on the minds of men was shatter-

ing. Christianity had been given the *coup de grace* at last. Man was not, as the Church taught, a fallen creature: he had come from sub-human ancestors and was gradually progressing towards perfection. God the Creator had been thrust out of His universe. There is no super-nature, only nature. It does not fall within the province of this paper to examine what has happened, and is happening, in our own time. That will be dealt with by the reader of the next paper. All I would say is that the deification of man has gone still further. As man conquers and tames his environment more and more, he believes himself to be omnipotent.

> 'The seal of his knowledge is sure, the truth and his spirit are wed . . .
> Glory to Man in the highest! for Man is the master of things.'

There are no sacred, transcendent Absolute Values: whatever values there are man creates for himself. He whom Reinhold Niebuhr calls 'the autonomous individual' is the representative of our age.

> 'There's a new tribunal now,
> Higher than God's—the educated man's!'

Browning's words from *The Ring and the Book* are most apposite. We have moved a long way—indeed to the farthest extent possible—from the weltanschauung of the Renaissance humanist; from a theocentric humanism to an anthropocentric humanism, of which the scientific humanism of Professor Julian Huxley is typical.

As we contemplate this tragedy, we ask the question, 'Who is to blame?' It is fatally easy to castigate the scientists; nor are we right if we do; for the eminent men of science, with few exceptions, have been, and are, humble seekers after truth, men devoted to the cause of Truth; and it can therefore be argued that they were dominated by one of the three Absolute Values. For the most part the blame does not lie at the door of the scientists. Instead of accusing them of destroying Christianity, rather should the Church, which claims to know the mind of God, examine herself. 'Physician, heal thyself' is an injunction which she would do well to ponder; for when science has discovered new truth, the Church has invariably resisted it. Copernicus puts forward the heliocentric hypothesis (a hypothesis, not a dogma), dedicates his book to the Pope, and escapes condemnation by the Roman Church only because he lives in the pre-Tridentine, pre-Jesuit era. There are, however, churchmen ready to condemn him: the Protestant Reformers will have none of his theory. 'People give ear,' thunders Luther, 'to an upstart astrologer who strove to show that the earth revolves, not the heaven or the firmament, the sun and the moon. Whoever wishes to appear clever must devise some new system, which of all systems is of course the very best. This fool wishes to reverse the entire science of astronomy; but sacred Scripture tells us that Joshua commanded the sun to stand still, and not the earth' (quoted

by Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, p. 550). Calvin is equally contemptuous. He (so he thought) demolished the theory of Copernicus by quoting the first verse of Psalm 93: 'The world also is stablished, that it cannot be moved'; and by adding: 'Who will venture to place the authority of Copernicus above that of the Holy Spirit?' What he failed to see was that Copernicus was inspired by the Holy Spirit. Galileo, who adopted the heliocentric theory, was twice condemned by the Holy Office, recanted, and gave his word never to say again that the earth rotated and revolved. This attitude of resistance to new truth has continued. The story of the encounter of Darwin and Huxley with the theologians is so well known that it need not be repeated. It is my contention that the theologians in their blindness missed their opportunity. They allowed man to deify himself because they failed to teach him the great truth of the immanence of God in all Nature, including man himself. They failed to teach men that the new discoveries were the fruit of the operation of God's Spirit and that therefore men should worship, not themselves, but the God whose Holy Spirit was working in and through them. Dr. Barry puts it like this: 'That is the tragedy of the last three centuries. When the new knowledge flowed in, new desires were struggling for expression and a new power was put into man's hands to mould the order of nature to his will, the official Church was found on the wrong side. It offered the modern world a false choice—between belief in God, as it understood Him, and what seemed to be belief in Progress and the hopefulness and wonder of Man's life. Its vision of God was too poor and sterile to inspire and direct all the new knowledge and the enterprise and confidence engendered by it' (F. R. Barry, *The Relevance of Christianity*, p. 131).

I come now to the second factor in the disintegration of the sacred and the secular. The first is the deification of man; the second is the degradation of man by the makers and begetters of Protestant theology. Here we have the antithesis of the modern temper, which, as we have seen, deifies man. The Protestant Reformation was, fundamentally, a revival (some would call it a recrudescence) of Augustinianism. As we know, the Bishop of Hippo taught the doctrine of man's total depravity. Martin Luther is one of his disciples. His conviction that the nature of man was completely corrupt sprang from his personal experience just as Augustine's had done. He was overwhelmed by the burden of his own sinful condition. How could he escape the wrath of God, so sinful was he? 'Fear drove me to desperation, nothing but death remained for me. I must sink down to Hell.' Those words, which are a translation of three lines from one of Luther's hymns, describe the state of his mind. 'Luther,' writes Professor Hermann Sasse, 'had the gift of a particularly tender conscience, and connected with it, an unusually vivid consciousness of the reality of God' (in *A History of Christian Thought*, ed. E. G.

Selwyn, p. 113). It was this consciousness of his own foulness that led him to accept and teach the extremely pessimistic Augustinian doctrine of man's total depravity, a doctrine which I have called the degradation of man. Luther claimed that he found this doctrine in Holy Writ. He begins his lecture on Romans (1515-6) thus: 'The essence of this Epistle is the complete destruction and eradication of all wisdom and righteousness of the flesh, however great these may seem in the eyes of man and to ourselves, and however sincere and upright they may be; and the planting and firm establishment of sin whatever the degree of its absence or apparent absence.' (The translation is Professor Sasse's in *A History of Christian Thought*, p. 117.) What Luther believed about the nature of man was summed up in the Lutheran Formula Concordiae of 1577: 'Original sin is not a slight, but so deep a corruption of human nature, that nothing healthy or incorrupt in man's body or soul, in his inner or outward powers, remains; but as the Church sings: Through Adam's fall is corrupted all Nature and human essence. This unspeakable injury cannot be discerned by reason, but only from God's Word.' Arguing from this premiss that man is totally corrupt, Luther asserts that the whole world is in thrall to the devil. All human actions, even the noblest, are 'subject to the corrupting influence of the self-seeking will which refuses to surrender itself unreservedly to the love of the Creator' (J. H. Oldham, in *Church, Community, and State*, vol. I, p. 134). In opposition to this evil world stands the Church, proclaiming the gospel of God's forgiveness. Prominent in Luther's thought is the conviction that the Church and the world, the sacred and the secular, are radically hostile to each other. As you see, this is a disintegration of the sacred and the secular; it is a divorcing of the secular realm from the realm of Absolute Values. In consequence, Lutheranism has produced an individualistic type of Christianity. Let Christians concentrate on personal piety and leave the world to its own devices. Participation in secular affairs is irrelevant, nay, undesirable. Whatever influence the Church may have on the world is limited to the manifestation of love in relations with individuals. As Reinhold Niebuhr points out, Luther had two ethics, a private and a public one. 'Luther,' he says, 'places a perfectionist private ethic in juxtaposition to a realistic, not to say, cynical, official ethic' (*The Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. II, p. 201). So, for example, he condemns the peasants for demanding the abolition of serfdom, because it 'would make all men equal and so change the spiritual kingdom of Christ into an external worldly one. Impossible! An earthly kingdom cannot exist without inequality of persons. Some must be free, others serfs, some rulers, others subjects' (*Works*, Weimar edn., vol. XVIII, p. 326). Lest it should be urged that in Luther's concept of 'calling' (beruf), the concept that a Christian's calling in life is God-given (cf. 'that state of life unto which it shall please God to call me', in the Anglican Catechism),

we have the notion that the sacred sanctifies the secular, I would point out that, noble as the concept sounds, it meant no more than the acceptance of the social *status quo* as the will of God. The truth is that Lutheranism is a dualism: there is, and will be till Christ comes again at the end of the world, war between the Church and the world. A comment by Reinhold Niebuhr sums up Lutheran theology: he says that it 'is the Protestant way of despairing of the world and of claiming victory for the religious ideal without engaging the world in combat' (*Does Civilisation need Religion?* p. 110). This same dualism is to be found in the thought of the other creator of Protestantism, Calvin. As Luther did, Calvin took over Augustine's doctrine of man's total depravity. He saw man as a fallen creature corrupted through his voluntary defection from the good. We humans are 'perverted and corrupted in all the parts of our nature' (*Institutes*, I, 5, 6, 7, 8); and although it would be untrue to say that Calvin thought that every man was as bad as he could possibly be or that man did not possess natural virtues and capabilities, which are partly relics of the natural image of God, partly the result of the operation of grace restraining the full development of corruption, and partly the gift of God's Spirit, nevertheless he states that these virtues (or 'images of virtue', as he calls them) are not rooted in true godliness and do not possess the character of a righteousness which is truly pleasing to God. From this doctrine Calvin drew the same inference which Luther did: the world is evil, and therefore the Church, the society of the predestined elect, stands opposed to it. Yet unlike Luther, Calvin was not prepared to surrender the world to evil. He did not believe that the Church should hold aloof from the world. Rather must she impose her rule upon the world. She must make the community a Christian community by placing the whole range of life under her own control. So Calvin created a church-state in Geneva, a state governed by an omnicompetent Church. He believed that he was establishing a theocracy, as indeed he was; but the God who ruled Geneva was not the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, but the stern revengeful Yahweh of the Old Testament. Calvin's attempt to impose his system on Geneva was repeated by his followers in other parts of the world, e.g. Scotland, the Netherlands, the New England colonies, and South Africa. What a tragic failure it has been! Calvinism tried to conquer the world: in the end it was conquered by the world. Far from establishing a Christian society, Calvinism has inspired and sanctified such diabolical doctrines as laissez-faire and apartheid. Thus Lutheranism and Calvinism started from the same point of departure and, while they have taken different routes, have reached the same destination—the divorce of the secular sphere from the sphere of the sacred Absolute Values.

I have examined the causes and the progress of the malady called the disintegration of the sacred and the secular. It is not for me to prescribe

the remedy here. The last two papers, which will deal with the attempts to reintegrate Christianity and secular life that are being made in contemporary theology and in the life of the Church, will do that. I would, however, suggest that there is no need to look very far for it. To my mind, it is to be found in the Christian Humanist tradition; by which I do not mean the Neo-thomism of Maritain, Gilson, and those who follow in their train. As Dr. Barry reminded us more than a quarter of a century ago, to try to revive Thomism 'as the only faith that can integrate experience and give society an enduring basis . . . would appear to be as hopeful as it would be to reconstruct ethics on the basis of the Song of Deborah . . . A mere glance at a diagram of the universe, as Dante and St. Thomas conceived it, is enough to show that no modern world-view can be built upon the Scholastic philosophy. Experimental science has shattered it. No attitude which is based on that position can hope to bring back the Christian faith into the centre of the modern outlook, and the ways of life and forms of experience which express our evolutionary philisophy' (F. R. Barry, *The Relevance of Christianity*, p. 128). Neo-thomism is not the answer to our problems. I believe that Christian Humanism is, by which I mean the Humanism which is to be found in the spirit of men like Clement of Alexandria, Origen, the Oxford Reformers, Hooker, Jeremy Taylor, George Herbert, the Cambridge Platonists and, to come nearer to our own time, in Hensley Henson's *Christian Morality* and Dr. Raven's *Evolution and the Christian Conception of God*. These thinkers differ in many particulars; yet they have one thing in common, which is the vital thing: they all emphasize to a greater or lesser degree the immanence of God in Nature, of which man is a part. That, I believe, should be our starting-point when we are trying to solve this problem of the relationship between the sacred and the secular: the immanence of God. What I am trying to say has been so well put by Professor Stanley Cook: 'Not the immanence of a transcendent God, but the transcendence of an immanent God, is the primary experience; and that is to say that God is infinitely more than all Man can know of Him' (*The Rebirth of Christianity*, Pelican edn., p. 128).

In conclusion, I must say that I fear that I have over-simplified the problem. 'In the history of ideas, the great danger is over-simplification,' says Professor Whitehead in *Adventures of Ideas* (Pelican edn., p. 29). If I have committed this error, then I derive comfort from the dictum of Dumby in Oscar Wilde's *A Woman of No Importance*: 'Life would be very dull without mistakes.'

THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR
THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION

By the Rev. S. F. Linsley, Director of the Industrial Christian Fellowship

Our concern is with the conditions of right order in the world and of right order as constituted by the co-ordination of the two realms, sacred and secular, within an organic unity. It is the interaction and tension between the two realms represented by these terms which constitute the texture of history and provide a guiding principle in confronting the issues of our own time.

The sacred is understood to apply to that which has, or claims to have, about it a transcendent quality which is invested with a status and an authority deriving from above and not from below, from God and not from man. It carries with it the implication of absoluteness of value.

The secular is taken to include all human activities and institutions concerned with this world which are products of man's own creative activity and capacity.

Towards the secular, man behaves as master and overlord. With the sacred man must keep his distance. He stands under, not over it; underlord.

The sacred has the mission and function to penetrate and inform the secular, and it must have concern and contact with secular world activity. The secular realm has its own rightful autonomy, yet it cannot be self-sufficient for all the needs of man.

The sacred must not over-reach itself or unduly fetter the relative freedom of self-expression which the secular should enjoy. It will recognize that there is a quality of holy-worldliness. It is only the pomps and vanities of the world which are to be renounced, not the good things of the world, for God made the whole world and saw that it was very good. It carried a highly commended status. The earth is the Lord's, and all that therein is; the compass of the world and they that dwell therein (Ps. 24). There is power to laugh and love and live fully, in the world.

Unholy worldliness is a bad thing in using the world to promote the lusts of the flesh and the snares of the devil, turning laugh into leer, love into lust and life into limbo.

Here is tension in plenty. A 'yes' and 'no' in one breath. As Dr. Vidler has said, we have the 'yes' of David, dancer, lover, father, fighter, over against the 'no' of John the Baptist, ascetic, locust eater, wilderness wanderer. Yet Jesus of the House of David was baptized of John Baptist. He came eating and drinking to live and give a fuller life. He came to save the world, and to that end He lived in its midst, seeking and saving sinners in it by friendship and service among them, not by withdrawal

from them. *Jesus, friend of sinners*, is a term of consummate resolution. The tension between sacred and secular is being let down when Jesus intercedes.

To make this possible the Body of Jesus must move into the world. It will spend more time in the secular realm than in the sacred. Dr. John Oman has reminded us that 'in the life of Jesus there is meagre interest in specially sacred doings; yet profound interest in most ordinary things of secular life'. The manner of the birth of the Body of Jesus sets the pattern. The Liturgy of Bethlehem is the travail of confinement. The incense is the odour of animals. The music, the mooing of the ox. The baby-body of Jesus born of Mary goes into the world from the level of the animals in a stable. Even the wisest men will look for it in the wrong place, while humble shepherds working a night-shift will be led straight to it.

The Body in due course becomes a working-Body in a secular vocation, and not as a Priest-workman. Jesus was of the wrong tribe for the Jewish priesthood. He was, in the technical sense, a lay-workman who spent some eighteen years of hard labour at and about a carpenter's bench. Justin Martyr, writing in the middle of the second century, says, 'Jesus used, when among men, to work as a carpenter making ploughs and yokes.' He claims actually to have seen yokes and ploughs which had been made by Jesus. The hands of the Body had been marked and scarred by wood and nails long before Calvary. The sacred Head surrounded by crown of piercing thorn on the Cross had been thoroughly secularized in wood for years past, and more than this, the secular instruments of the carpenter's craft were identical with those used to fasten his Body to the carpenter's raw material—wood. The wounds in the hands were made made by the hammer and nails which those hands had handled through years of craftsman's toil. These are no 'symbols of the passion'. They are piercing realities bringing the tension between sacred Body and unholy use of secular instruments to an agonizing pitch. Yet even so the tension is resolved. Hammer and nails have scarred the hands long ago. The more important factor is the life of the secular soldier wielding the hammer and striking the nail. 'Father, forgive . . . ' Jesus, friend of sinners: Supreme resolution.

Much more frightening for us here is the part played in this crucifixion by the supposed sacred. The custodian of the sacred is surely Caiaphas, the High Priest of the Jewish religion. Of all the people on earth at the time, he should have recognized the Christ, the looked-for Messiah, yet he was the chief engineer of the crucifixion. God's sacred High Priest compassing the death of God's sacro-secular Son is the most dreadful paradox in history, and I have come to feel that the Creed should say 'suffered under Caiaphas' rather than 'under Pontius Pilate'. When we include with Caiaphas the Scribes, the Pharisees, the Elders and the Sadducees, we shall be in less danger of presuming that the human-sacred

is necessarily the holy. The Gospel picture purges the presumption in showing us that, on the whole, the sacred section of the Chosen People were chiefly responsible for the death of Jesus the Christ and that His disciples and friends were in the main seculars. The claim made by Jesus that He had come not to call the righteous but sinners to repentance seems to bear heavily upon our consideration of the disintegration of the Sacred and the Secular.

From this salutary thought, may we pass to the consideration of the Sacred Ministry of our own time? Jesus is no longer the centre of the controversies of our day. In the life of His day on earth He most certainly was. In our own land, with its increasing secularization, we have to face the fact of these figures:

According to the Statistics' Officer at Church House, there are now 16,500 ordained clergy in England and Wales engaged in more or less full-time work. There are over 3,000 clergy living in retirement at present. There are over 13,000 parishes in the Provinces of Canterbury and York and more than half of them are still rural. The Church needs 600 new deacons a year to offset the loss by death and retirement, and in no year since 1914 has this number been reached. Since 1945 the number of ordinations has never been sufficient to replace the annual loss. The average age of the working clergy is now between 50 and 55 years of age. Since 1952, about one-quarter of the annual ordinations have been of men over 40. In 1956, there were 496 new deacons ordained in the two provinces. Since 1900, the population of England has increased by over one-third and the number of clergy has declined by about one-fifth.

These figures are beginning to be known, but we need to study their implication more deeply. In spite of the decline in numbers, there is still one working ordained clergyman to every 3,000 of the total population, which shows clearly that there is something seriously amiss with the distribution. The disintegration of the Sacred and the Secular is in some measure due to the paucity of priests, and any strategy of reintegration must at least consider the distribution of the Sacred Ministry in terms of contemporary needs. At present some areas and neighbourhoods of greatest need have the fewest ordained men.

Then mention must be made of what I will call the domiciliary background of clerical families to-day. I have been privileged to visit and stay in over 300 in the past 3½ years, ranging from palace to council-house. It is possible that the greatest social revolution of the past quarter of a century has been experienced in the homes of the clergy from deacons to bishops (and maybe to archbishops!).

One true story will go far in illustration. I stayed with a bishop whose remaining retainer had just gone the way of many cooks—away. The bishop's wife was visiting in the local parish and the bishop said, 'come

and help make a cup of tea'. We processed to the kitchen and the bishop struck a match to light the electric stove!

I arrived at a rectory one Saturday night in a blizzard. The hot-water tank burst as I crossed the threshold and, needless to say, the rector's wife had no week-end help. We managed, of course, but it was a very harassed woman who went to take the Sunday School on the Sunday afternoon. The women of the manse have done more than history recognizes to integrate the sacred and the secular, and the near-slavery which many of them endure to-day is a factor in our considerations here. Then I know quite a number of the sons of clerical families who, knowing at first-hand the struggles of their parents economically, turn away from following in father's sacred footsteps. Equally true is it to say that many do follow those footsteps, knowing the cost.

House chores, especially in the winter, make an ordered prayer life a matter of the sternest discipline in both country and town vicarages, and the hands of many clergy and their wives are marked by labour like those of their Master and His mother, Mary of Nazareth. Clerks in Holy Orders are, in many cases, more appropriately to be called worker-priests, especially if they have young children. I remember vividly giving communion to the wife of a young vicar. Her hands were discoloured, lined and cracked and she tried to hide them as she held them out. How the scarred hands of Jesus must have risen in blessing! This is not sentimental appeal propaganda but hard fact, and it has its part in our thinking, for the more the vicar and his wife are necessarily tied to their home-work, the less they can be integrators in the world.

On their economic plight we can but think of two terms, status and differentials, and a Guild-Union of Parsons and their wives could enter with confidence the lists where battles are fought about rates for the job, overtime, Sunday double pay, incentives, expenses allowance and not forgetting Easter Offerings. The sacred ministry cannot compete with secular economic status-values, and the work of integration has an expenses sheet.

Now we turn to our present discontents in a Britain where, on the whole, the areas where large industrial units are situated are solidly secularized. Most of the folk have little knowledge of Christian truth, and what they know of it is prejudiced and distorted. Commercial life is little better, and the modern agricultural worker is probably the toughest nut of all. It is trite to say that most of the folk who crowded into the towns during and after the Industrial Revolution were never absorbed into the worshipping life of the town parishes.

It is also true to say that in some areas, e.g. the Staffordshire part of the Black Country and the Potteries, there was a strong tradition of church life among working men and women in the mills, factories and works. Also in many large towns, and especially in London, there were many

parish priests who worked heroically among their people, ministering to souls and bodies which were victims of an unjust social system. They were respected and in many cases loved, yet their sacrificial work did not build up large numbers of working folk into ordinary church life. In the experience of most of us here, we have to deal with a generation which has inherited habits of life which do not include, and the people concerned do not see why they should include, corporate worship in any church. At a conservative estimate, 90 to 95 per cent of the 'workers' in Britain are outside any church membership, and we have a situation in which communicant members of the Church in the West Indies, having come here to find work, lose their faith in our midst. People, coming from the uttermost parts of the earth to what they had believed was their Jerusalem, have lost their faith in that Jerusalem. There can be no doubt about the urgency of the missionary task in Britain now. The sacred and the secular are hardly in tension, for there is so little consciousness of the sacred to raise it.

It is a sad thing to those of us who were in the middle of the unemployment of the 1920's and 1930's, with all the suffering and deadly frustration which millions of men, women and children endured. We have lived to see what is probably the most remarkable change in the whole of our social history. In thirty years the circumstances of life have changed completely, and from a situation in which millions had no jobs we have passed to one of near full employment with social conditions which were, we thought, idle dreams thirty years ago. In our ignorance we should have thought that this almost miraculous change for the better in living and working conditions would have bred in our people at least a thankfulness in which God would take some share, but it has not turned out that way. When we speak now of raising standards of living, we must be more careful to define what we mean by living. If material benefits are all that are in mind, then already we can see that, like patriotism, they are not enough. Too much, even of good secular material, will sap character quicker than disciplined plain living, and we are made to see the value of fasting in a new light. This is one of the main lessons which the truly sacred has to teach and the holy secular to learn in this present situation. (We remember, too, at this moment that the evils of inflation had much to do with the rise of Hitler in Germany and the precipitation of the last World War.)

It is precisely at this stage that we recall that when Jesus lived on earth he was for most of the time a lay-workman who came up through the various levels of the industry of his day, apprentice, journeyman, craftsman and master. He understood by personal experience both work problems and work people at all levels. It is not therefore surprising that when he began to preach and teach 'the common people heard him gladly', for he had shared their working life and talked in a language which they

could understand, illustrated by homely stories. When he picked his disciples he chose men from that same working background, and we recall that some of the intelligentsia of that day despised him and his followers for being what they were. We are humbly obliged to ask both Church and Work-world what has happened to cause the Work-world to sit so loosely to the Jesus who of all leaders in history shared that working secular life. Peter and Andrew, James and John even left their work to leap to his call. Most workers to-day couldn't care less about the whole thing. How far is the Church of our day to blame? We recall with fear and trembling that it was the Jewish Church leaders who, in the main, were responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus. This is no reflection on Jewry to-day of course, but Caiaphas led the opposition and demanded the death penalty, however much charity may seek to cover justice. Here perhaps is the constant warning to the sacred not to presume on its sonship to Abraham. It is my own firm conviction, culled from mission experience, that one of our main hindrances in permeating the secular order with Christian truth is the wrong picture which people in that order have of the Deity Who reveals that truth. In the imagination of millions of people, God is 'him up there'; in more pious moments it is 'the one above'. God is semi-consciously pictured as an old man with a beard sitting on a throne with a fearsome sceptre in his hand poised to wallop you if you say a naughty word. Jesus is likewise pictured as a frail and pale Galilean floating through life with his feet off the ground. In an age which is picture-riddled we know only too well how bad pictures will call up strong emotions leading to bad deeds, and false pictures about the Deity in the gallery of the picture-dominated mind will work untold harm and bring to nought many of the superficial attempts at mission work. We don't even start from scratch in this race; we are many generations behind the starting line. Bad religious art and some lamentable stained-glass will have much to answer for in the Judgment Day, but we in the Ministry of the Church have to find the answer to some very searching and cutting questions about the way in which these distortions have found their way into millions of minds and subverted millions of souls. Why is it that a religion founded by one who was at least a perfect man, who called to men and received a sacrificial response, should now in our country have to admit that four-fifths of its congregations consist of women. It may be true that women have men beaten for insights into the truths of the Faith, but that does not wholly satisfy. There is an unbalance even in our congregations which is not to be explained so easily, and we have to accuse ourselves and look into our teaching with penitence to find out how and why such a caricature of the Deity has spread abroad.

Operation Firm Faith is a laudable venture, but the first—and last—question to be asked is 'firm faith in what and in whom?'

This case may be overstated, and there are of course many other factors

involved, but it seems to me to be fundamental to think deeply about the injunction given, so it is said, by Dean Inge to a young priest who asked him what he should preach about, and was told, 'preach about God and about twenty minutes!' In the circumstances of our day, or indeed of any day, unless the men we have in mind see Jesus at least as Perfect Man, they will never with St. Thomas call him Lord and God. This submission is strengthened by the remembrance of a lecture in which the lecturer showed how in the Synoptic Gospels the disciples began by going about with Jesus, watching the way in which he lived, taught and behaved. They thought of him as a former carpenter who had given up that job to be a teacher, healer and prophet. In the beginning they had little idea of anything else. After more than a year of this close companionship, Jesus, at Caesarea Philippi abruptly asked them to tell him who they thought he was. Suddenly Peter the fisherman had a flash of inspiration. The truth dawned that this Jesus was none other than the looked-for Christ, but it took more than a year of close companionship before Peter was ready to recognize the something more in Jesus and add the Messianic name of Christ. If this is not so, then what is the point of the epic of Caesarea Philippi?

The estranged secular Peters of to-day don't stand a chance to find the Christ unless we teach them not only the truth as it is in him, but also the true idea of him. The Second Commandment has a modern adaptation of grave moment. Image-portrayal plays a large part in the affairs of the secular world, as we cannot avoid seeing when we travel. The experts of the advertising medium know this full well and the television millions, in spite of some good programmes, are being conditioned in a mass mental imagery which will increasingly affect our way of life. There is a widespread sitting, if not bowing down, before images, and a near-worship of favourite personalities by their strangely-called 'fans', which makes the Golden Calf of Aaron mere chicken-feed. The clergy know how the problem of house visiting has been affected by the 'Telly'. The fascination may in some measure pass and religious programmes may make a deeper impression, but it is doubtful whether the effect will be towards the building up of the worshipping Church. The vast output of picture-imagery constantly hitting the eyes—and one smack in the eye is worth three in the ear—is doing little to change the semi-conscious distortion of the idea of the Deity which prevails. Xenophanes might have been writing for this age when he said, 'Mortals fancy gods are born, and wear clothes, and have voice and form like themselves. Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; Thracians give theirs blue eyes and red hair.'

The vast question of the merits and demerits of popular culture is an understandably complex one. How far is it an integrating influence, bringing people together and gradually moving, by sensible discrimination, to better tastes and more informed appreciation, or how far is it a

thoroughly disintegrating influence steadily undermining all things bright and beautiful? Are these human activities behind and in mass culture gradually absorbing transcendental qualities and evolving value absolutes?

There seem to be three current attempts to answer this question:—

(*a*) Naturally there are those who hold that, largely because of the money motive, those who provide the subject matter for reading, viewing and listening to-day and to-night must give the public what it wants or they will be out of business. They will say that the tastes of the people are in the direction of the world, the flesh and the macabre, and these things they will have. The leanings are low and largely corrupt, but then that is the way of things, so what can you do about it? You cannot change human nature, anyway.

(*b*) Then to the contrary, there are those who say that the pessimists are as usual painting the black picture and that modern mass-culture is basically sound, transparently honest, abounding in real life—whatever that may mean—and thoroughly healthy. Dance music, Rock an' Roll, films, plays and Futurist art are simply the natural expressions of developing life, and there's nothing to worry about if you can only keep the jaundice out of your eye. Then,

(*c*) Inevitably there are those who never go to extremes, who pride themselves on their fair-minded balance and sanity, who sternly maintain that things haven't really changed and that, anyway, bear-baiting, cock-fighting, gin palaces and the 'naughty nineties' were nothing to trumpet about in the good old days. People have more sense than to be led away by the trivial and that they do not allow these entertaining fripperies to penetrate below the skin. There are dangers, of course, but the heart of the people is sound.

Yet when all three have had their say, there is apparent agreement that at least sections of contemporary mass-culture are debasing, vice-provoking and jungle-minded. I have just read about a school—a mixed school—round which police patrols have been keeping guard against gangs after a master had been beaten up; he was the music master. The gang was waiting outside an annexe to the school at 2.45 p.m., and when the master appeared the gang beat him up and ran away. An American film, 'The Blackboard Jungle', had been showing in the local cinema. Its theme was the terrorizing of masters by their teen-age pupils. This is no new phenomenon, and most of us here played cowboys and Indians after seeing a Western at some time in our lives, but there is now a certain viciousness; the fun and games have passed in some degree to the devilish, and the disintegrating influences are beating daily upon millions. However much we may minimize the danger, there can be no grounds for complacency, and especially when cricket has now come under the spell of the treble chance. It is significant indeed to read (*Evening News*, July 18/57), 'Go

West for your Batsmen. The Worcester–Gloucester game on the Treble Chance cricket pool coupon has bright possibilities for punters—five maximum-points batsmen . . . '

The Rev. David Sheppard carries a weighty load of sacred responsibility in this secularized sphere where the 'flanelled fools' are being ducked in the same pool as the 'muddied oafs'!

Perhaps this movement of sport towards the money-basis is the most revealing facet of disintegration in contemporary life. When sport moves over to mammon, mammon may be playing the devil with fair play. I remember William Temple saying that when a game has an ulterior motive it ceases to be a game.

Now may we pass to some considerations of the tensions in modern industry and the work-world? It is still said that you cannot be a Christian in business, and we have a devastating answer at once: 'Oh yes you can.' Why? 'Because the first Christian was in business.' Yet we must be much more careful than sometimes we are about making impassioned appeals from pulpit and platform about witnessing in industry. After listening to a mighty peroration to a sermon about going forth to give personal witness in the working world, I am sorely tempted to stand up and say, 'You go and have a try'! In the past fifty years almost the entire circumstances of men and women, youths and maidens, at work have changed beyond comparison with anything that has happened before in history. Modern resources are so vast. The power to make, to do and to move, together with the power over each other have increased with incredible speed, and the shift in power points has brought new people into power positions with all the tensions which responsibility and irresponsibility in the wielding of power inevitably bring. To witness in this vortex is, in a sense, a highly specialized function which carries new problems. To illustrate this point, suppose that a man has responded to the appeal of such a sermon and goes off on Monday morning to find that his gang at the factory is working to rule. He thinks that here is the chance to witness and does so by trying to work normally. The probability is that he will lose not only his job but also his union card. He may have to find not only another job but also another type of work altogether. To make a sermon appeal for personal witness truly Christian, the preacher must have a considerable sum of money to support the man and his family until he trains for and finds a new job, perhaps in a new area altogether. This may seem an extreme case, yet it is by no means beyond possibility. The witness of the human-sacred in the secular work sphere is much more a matter of group activity than individual bravery. We are learning afresh by hard experience that the Christian life is team life and that the norm of its worship as of its witness is corporate activity. We see in a new light the disintegrating influence of those people inside the Church who think in terms of my church, my communion, my prayers, my vicar, my pew, and indeed

MY GOD! You soon stop using the word 'my' in modern industrial mission work.

We see also the danger of the wrong kind of prayers. To pray variations of the theme, 'Dear God, bless me and mine and everything to do with me and mine' in the surest way of secularizing the sacred and indeed of damning the soul.

Then not only have we the vastness of industrial development—there are now about 284,000 companies in operation in Britain, and 8,263,741 members of Trades Union—but we have also the deep tensions which industrial paradoxes bring to millions of people of all ages. As a great student of the scene (Sir John Maud) has reminded us, we are participators in greater freedom and more slavery; deeper fellowship and suicidal loneliness; fuller security and dangerous precariousness; higher civilization and blatant barbarism. To be subject to these tugs-of-war in the span of little more than one generation is to realize the scope of disintegration and the inevitable strain, not least upon nerves, of those who have no choice but to endure them.

While we have greater freedom in our jobs, our education, our family life and our play, we have greater slavery to the bench, the desk, the factory, the Trades Union, the State and the Taxman.

Deeper fellowship in the mine, the work-place, the Union and the club is offset by greater loneliness in the suburb, the hostel, the huge cities and the suburban train. The suicide rate of the most highly developed Welfare States is a grim corrective to those who think that they are the final answer to integration questions.

There is greater security for millions and deeper fears that the whole world will disintegrate in a nuclear flash.

There are new heights in civilization through building, housework appliances, the arts, opera, opportunities in education, and yet greater depths of barbarism in spoliation, viciousness, vandalism, litter-loutishness, drug-addiction and the rest.

So we must move to a stop, even though the stop be a question mark. There is disintegration in the contemporary scene, yet we are thereby reminded that life is continually moving towards that disintegration which we call death, and as Christians we believe that through disintegrating death we move on to re-integrated life.

Our world is and is becoming more and more man-fashioned. The industrial developments will gather still more speed even in those countries which pioneered its revolution. In the undeveloped countries, industrialization will speed up with unprecedented momentum, and in a human sense, nothing can stop it. There are, e.g., in China, industrial revolutions taking place now far greater than our own and at many times the rate, and the clashes and tensions will be magnified in proportion to their size and speed of development. In our own case we have taken

several generations of revolutionary activity before we have begun to ask such simple and basic questions as to the purpose of it all; about the nature and life of man himself; why he works and should work; how he can be fulfilled in true community; about values in society; about the will to work at all; aims and priorities, and a host of others. *In our optimistic moments* we may think that some transcendent qualities are at last coming through to the surface out of the pain and travail of revolutionary striving. To meet the upward thrust of struggling humanity there is at last a recognition that man stands under another order of which he is not the master. There is a status within a sacred order without which his status in the secular realm will turn to dust and fall-out. Experience is teaching us the hard way that man cannot live by bread alone, however secure it may seem. In this mood we begin to think out how we can help those who are travelling at a quicker rate but upon the same road as we have travelled, and we see the whole mission field opening out in a vision of unprecedented opportunity.

Equally so, *in our perhaps more realistic moments*, we think along the lines that God cannot be brought in like Pooh-Bah to give artistic verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative. The questions we are driven to ask are still utilitarian and of the earth earthy. We want men to be happy and glorious not for God's sake, but for their own. We want the human and material factors in industry to work harmoniously together, in order that production may rise, profits and wages soar and everything in the earthy garden be lovely. Disintegration!

Studdert Kennedy in his prophetic genius speaks to this generation as to his own in his poem, 'If I had a million pounds':

> I would buy me a perfect island home,
> Sweet set in a southern sea,
> And there would I build me a paradise
> For the heart of my love and me.
>
> I would plant me a perfect garden there,
> The one that my dream soul knows,
> And the years would flow as the petals grow,
> That flame to a perfect rose.
>
> I would build me a perfect temple there,
> A shrine where *my* Christ might dwell,
> And then would I wake to behold my soul
> Damned deep in a perfect hell.

Just which of these two moods is the right one is hard to say, and there are arguments of weight each way. A question which both sacred and secular have to face is this: God the Father placed His Son Jesus in the work-world of industry. A considerable proportion of the world's workers to-day are trying to follow the teachings of one who by no stretch of the

word could be called an 'industrial worker'; economist, historian, philosopher—Karl Marx, and yet they despise the person and teachings of Jesus who was at least a working carpenter. Why? The answer to this question may well colour the destiny, either disintegration or reintegration, of the whole sacred and secular human race.

THE RE-INTEGRATION OF THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR IN CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY

By the Rev. L. A. Garrard, B.D., M.A., Principal of Manchester College, Oxford, and Editor of the *Hibbert Journal*

Having devoted one day to the thesis and a second to the antithesis, to-day we approach the synthesis. We have thus made at least a token recognition of awareness that our craving for integration (implicit in all religion, but particularly in its more liberal forms) must not be indulged without acknowledgment of a certain tension in our experience. It may be felt more acutely at certain periods of history, of which this is one, than at others, but it is always there. Von Hügel declared that 'religion has no subtler, and yet also no deadlier, enemy in the region of the mind than every and all Monism (*Myst. Ed.*, I.xvi). Collingwood was more explicit: 'The division of life into sacred and profane, Sundays and week-days, is a permanent and necessary feature of religion, though the highest and most positive religion always fights against it and tries to sanctify the whole of life' (*Speculum Mentis*, 33). We are not achieving an integration if we simply leave one factor out of account. We seek a genuine synthesis, not just a restatement of the thesis.

I believe that this is more important for us Modernists than for any other Christians. It is a common count in the indictment against us that we have lost touch with modern man precisely because we have ignored this tension in his experience. Modernism, it is often said, is not modern at all, but simply an optimistic theology which was modern at the end of the last century, but whose falseness and inadequacy have become more and more plain. Its wilful blindness came out in its refusal to see that man is such a fallen creature that he always absorbs the negative and destructive more easily than the positive side of our teaching. We have taught that Sunday is not the only day, nor church the only place, for keeping God in mind, and people have ceased to observe Sunday and to go to church without really making any effort to hallow their week-days or worship God in home and field and factory. We have told them that there is other inspired literature, and they have merely put away their Bible.

That these things have happened cannot be denied. It does not follow that Modernism bears the sole, or even the main responsibility. The struggle for freedom from authority does, of course, make for disintegration. We have always preferred to trust men with the truth, even when it is dangerous, rather than to treat them as babes to be fed with milk. For my part I am convinced that this is wise and that the alternative is a far more violent disintegration by revolution. We have only to study the actual writings of the liberals of fifty years ago to see that their optimism and credulity have been grossly exaggerated. It is those who want to confine God's activity to a restricted sphere labelled 'sacred', who cling to the attitude which Wesley had to outgrow, that it would be almost a sin to convert a man anywhere but in church, who are really responsible for much of the secularism of to-day.

At any rate, it has been quite clear from our discussions that we are far from insensitive to the tensions which are so deeply felt by thinking religious men in this age. We know that to identify religion with any particular historical synthesis is idolatry, but that to reject the world altogether is to ally ourselves with the forces of destruction and perchance to be found fighting against God, as Christopher Dawson has strikingly suggested (*Religion and Culture*, 206). My task to-day is to tell you something of the effect that this tension is having upon some of the leading modern theologians and of the ways in which they are looking for the kind of integration in which it can be resolved. I am only too conscious of the gaps in my knowledge of the work of many contemporary theologians. I salute, though I do not envy, those who have ploughed their way through the ten volumes and nearly 8,000 pages of Barth's *Dogmatik*. Of contemporary Roman Catholic theologians I am even more ignorant. I can only plead that, within my limitations, I have tried to do my best to draw the threads together and to present as clear a picture as I can. I shall not be surprised if at the end it is felt that I have only given the Prolegomena to an answer.

The book which for my immediate task I have found most helpful is Richard Niebuhr's *Christ and Culture*. What I found particularly valuable was the way in which he classifies in five groups the answers which Christian theology has given to this problem of the relation of the sacred and the secular (or, in more concrete terms, of God and the world). He is, of course, aware that the same man gives different answers at different times and his framework, which is expanded from one suggested by Troeltsch, must not be accepted too rigidly.

The first group might well have been called the dualists, had Niebuhr not wished to keep that name for one of his later compromise groups. Its motto is, 'My kingdom is not of this world', and it stands for a radical opposition of Christ to culture. It is represented by the writer of I John in the New Testament, by Tertullian, the founders of the monastic move-

ment, the Protestant sectaries, and in modern times by Tolstoy. When Schweitzer characterizes the teaching of Jesus as 'world-negating' (*Quest*, 400) and Klausner criticizes Jesus for imperilling Jewish civilization by divorcing religion and ethics from the rest of social life, they are placing him with those who stand for a disintegrating radicalism. On this I will only say that there was, of course, a prophetic note in his teaching and he was certainly not satisfied with the particular forms of integration that prevailed among the Jewish schools of his day; yet I do not think that one who taught the Parable of the Unjust Steward and humorously accepted the description of himself as 'a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber' can fairly be claimed as a supreme example of world-negation.

The second of Niebuhr's groups is at the other extreme. It claims a fundamental agreement between Christ and culture. Jesus is seen as a great hero in whom men's aspirations towards their values reach their culminating point. No great tension is felt between Church and world, between the workings of divine grace and human effort. If there is discord it will fade away when the transient and accidental are detached from the permanent and essential in both culture and Christianity. Those who belong to this group are the once-born or healthy-minded; Karl Barth dismisses them as 'culture-Protestants', though they are by no means confined to the ranks of Protestantism in the historic sense. Abelard, the early Schleiermacher and Ritschl are their outstanding figures. They stand for a theology of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man (to which the formulary of the nineteenth-century American Unitarians added 'salvation by character and progress onward and upward for ever'). Integration could hardly go further. In so far as there is still evil to be eliminated, this is due to nature's resistance to the spirit; man's task is to 'move upward, working out the beast, and let the ape and tiger die'.

Niebuhr finds more value in this position than is commonly recognized nowadays. The scholarship of Alexandria sowed the seed of the Church as well as the heroic intransigence of the martyrs. The translation of the Gospel into the vulgar tongue, which began when the New Testament was set down in Greek and has found a recent and provocative champion in Bultmann, is a necessary part of the Church's mission. This type of Christianity does full justice to the truth, which Jesus recognized, that some features of life in the world are better than others; it is a misuse of language to say that the virtues of the heathen are only attractive vices. The culture-Christian helps to save the Church from intellectual obscurantism and indifference to the struggle for order and justice in the world. His critics are often unconsciously idealizing and absolutizing the culture of a past age.

Nevertheless, this integration will not do, at any rate as a complete answer to our problem. The conflict with evil is not to be equated with evolutionary ascent. As Richard Niebuhr strikingly says, 'the Christ of

culture becomes a chameleon; . . . nothing but an honorific and emotional term by means of which each period attached numinous quality to its personified ideals' (*Christ and Culture*, 115). It is of the very essence of heresy to take some fragment of the New Testament picture and call this the essential Jesus. And since, if he is to remain a Christian at all, he cannot avoid giving offence by his adherence to what the Dean of Kings has recently called 'the scandal of particularity', the culture-Christian always seems to his allies in the world to be timidly stopping short at an arbitrary point. However much he may desire to base his faith on reason rather than revelation, there comes a point at which he has to go beyond reason.

The three remaining groups agree with one another in recognizing the difference between the two realms, while seeking to hold them together in some sort of unity. The first Niebuhr calls the synthetic type. The secular, at its best, may lead men to Christ, but only in so preparatory a way that there can be no true culture at all unless, above all our search for values, Christ enters into life bringing supernatural gifts. The paradox that he is both God and man, one person with two natures, is an expression of this outlook. Clement of Alexandria is its first great representative. As the Logos, the divine reason, Jesus teaches what any Stoic would recognize as sound reasoning; but, over and above this, he demands perfection and helps us to attain it.

The supreme synthesist is Aquinas. The Church had now accepted responsibility for all the great institutions of society. He is convinced (like Aristotle) of the superiority of the life of contemplation to life in the world, just as there is no doubt of the superiority of the wisdom of Christ to that of Aristotle. Yet he never loses sight of the possibilities of grace, which gives ultimate happiness to some at every stage and yet is at the same time continuously available through the institutions for the normally essential discipline of the moral life. His intellectual synthesis is the reflection of an actually existing social synthesis of church and culture. But already before the Renaissance and Reformation this social unity was disintegrating. It was a unity imposed from above and was bound sooner or later to be felt to be cramping a healthy development. We can never return to it, as romantics, not all of them Roman Catholics, would wish, because in the West modern men are not children as the men of the Middle Ages were, and they would not tolerate the corruptions of an all-powerful Church even if it could be revived. The nearest analogy in our day, in fact, is the achievement of the Russians under the direction of the Soviet state.

The type of solution which Thomism exemplifies has great merits. It holds together creation and salvation, proclaiming the sovereignty of God in the present as well as the past and the future. It enables the Christian to co-operate with unbelievers, while maintaining its witness to the divine

transcendence. Its weakness is that the synthesis for which it stands is of necessity provisional in a world which is in the process of evolution; there is a standing temptation to adopt a social conservatism that really belongs to culture-Christianity, and to limit the divine grace by canalizing it within existing institutions.

It seems, therefore, to be inevitable that a synthesis of this kind has no sooner been achieved than it becomes subject to criticism from the most religious spirits, who feel bound to protest at what looks like an accommodation of the claims of Christ to those of secular society. There thus arises a fourth group, Protestant in its objection to the established synthesis, yet distinguished from the radical dualism of the first group by its recognition that the Christian does have responsibilities to the world as well as to God. The Christian of this type is acutely conscious of conflict, but to him it is not a conflict between Christianity and the world, as it is for the radical Christian, nor one between spirit and nature, as it is for the culture-Christian, but a conflict between God and himself. He is not (or at any rate he knows that he should not be) concerned with God's judgment on those outside, he is an outsider himself and it is he who is judged. Just as Jesus attacked the Pharisees not because they were the worst element in the world he knew, but because, though the best, they were not good enough, so the Protestant opposes contemporary civilization at its noblest, knowing that it is here that man is in the greatest danger of usurping the place of God. Yet he himself belongs inescapably to this civilization, and he recognizes that it is by means of it that God sustains our existence. He is so conscious of tension that he sees it within God himself. As Niebuhr says, this type of Christian is seldom a Unitarian.

The first great example of this type is Paul. There are times when, as a practical organizer, he becomes almost a synthesist, but with him, unlike Clement or Thomas, Christ is always redeemer first and teacher second. The value of civilization is secondary and negative, as a restraint on the disintegrating force of sin. Even more representative of what Niebuhr rather misleadingly calls the dualist attitude is Luther. His special objection to the medieval synthesis is that it makes the more radical commands of Christ applicable only to the élite in the Church; as Inge once put it, it offered the Christian a pass degree as well as an honours school ('A New Reformation', *Hibbert Journal*, April 1943, p. 206). The regenerate man can and must serve his neighbour in obedience to God through philosophy, commerce, politics, culture and particularly music, and it is his duty to learn the special discipline of each; for, as Brunner has pointed out, it is just as disastrous to treat the man in need of first aid by the actual methods of the New Testament on the one hand as it is on the other to imagine that the most up-to-date technique and equipment are a substitute for the spirit that actuated the Good Samaritan (*Christianity and Civilization*, I, 153). While for myself I should turn the other cheek to the

aggressor, as my brother's keeper I must use force to protect my neighbours against force irresponsibly used, and if I neglect my responsibility in order to keep my hands clean, I am sinning far more deeply. Pecca fortiter, 'Do your duty in a sinful world without letting it get you down', is no bad motto in times like these. It is far removed from the later Lutheran tendency to live life in compartments and leave politics to the professional politicians.

This answer too has much to commend it, its faithfulness to experience, its dynamic sense of grace, its understanding of agape as response to my neighbour's need rather than a virtue to be acquired. It enables the Christian to leave the ultimate responsibility to God and do his duty as the moment requires. Its danger, inherent in all over-emphasis on divine transcendence, is that where all action in the world is seen as partaking of the nature of sin men may be discouraged from making the effort to live relatively decent lives. As Landor remarked, 'We must not indulge in unfavourable views of mankind. By doing so we make bad men believe that they are no worse than others, and we teach the good that they are good in vain.' Theologically it does less than justice to the goodness of God in creating and preserving, as distinct from redeeming the world. Its emphasis on the negative value of civilization as a restraint on sin, rather than as a positive means to the fellowship and unity which God desires to restore, leads almost inevitably to the conservatism which marks Paul's attitude to slavery and Luther's to the state.

So we come to our fifth and last group, whom Niebuhr calls the conversionists. They resemble those we have just been considering in believing that we have to maintain the fabric of civilization though we and it are alike under judgment, but they take a more positive view of culture and have a more balanced theological appreciation of creation and incarnation as well as redemption and atonement. The Fall is more sharply differentiated from the Creation, and its consequences are seen as the corruption of something intrinsically good. The world needs to be converted, rebuilt, rather than totally replaced by a new creation. The eschatology of the conversionist is in part at least a realized eschatology; he is as much concerned with the power of God to transform the world in the present as with what will happen to it in the end. There is much in the Fourth Gospel that represents this outlook, though it is found side by side with a radical opposition to the unduly favourable view of the world put forward by many of the Gnostics. It is also the dominant note in Augustine, though there are elements in that many-sided man which belong to each of our five categories. Certainly he was by no means exclusively the gloomy teacher of depravity and election that he is popularly considered. The Confessions are full of praise of God's creation and order, and *The City of God* is written to show how Christ has come to restore the unity and fellowship to which the social order, even in its corruption, points.

Wesley, though he understands salvation in an excessively individualistic way, belongs to this group, as his emphasis on Christian perfection shows. So does Reinhold Niebuhr, even if he is one of the severest critics of culture-Christianity, with its penchant for campaigns and crusades, which he is convinced often do more harm than good; Prohibition led to a wave of crime and League of Nations idealism to the rise of nationalism and the weakening of the democracies. He sees, on the other hand, a positive value in civilization, which provides the institutions in and through which alone we can honour and obey God in the world. Whether he is acknowledged or not, it is Christ who upholds the world order. In his later writing he is more hopeful about society than he was in *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. At any rate we must work for a juster order, even if we know that it can never be achieved in history.

To this group also we must assign Dietrich Bonhoeffer, though if anyone could have been forgiven for adopting a pessimistic view of the world it was he. He criticizes both radical and culture-Christians for failing to see that in Christ we are offered the possibility of partaking in the reality of God and in the reality of the world, but not in the one without the other. The Christian life must neither be set apart from the world nor fitted into a compartment of it; it must permeate the world from within, helping to transform it into new life in Christ by the power of faith and love. In one of his letters he speaks of the whole or perfect man, the opposite of St. James's 'double-minded man, unstable in all his ways'. Few men of our time have set a nobler pattern of integration within the individual life.

The purest representative of this group, in Richard Niebuhr's view, is F. D. Maurice, whose central conviction was that, whether we recognize it or not, we owe our very existence to Christ's work in upholding the world; this is indeed a principal reason why we should be united as brothers of one another. For Maurice, as for Augustine, evil is essentially a privation of good. The divine purpose, which must in the end prevail and is unceasingly at work in the world, is the conversion of all mankind from self-centredness to Christ-centredness.

Of the religious writers of our day, the one who stands nearest in spirit to Maurice is Berdyaev. He too is an incarnational Christian. Creation and preservation are the elements of the divine activity to which he delights to call attention, and man is called to co-operate with God in upholding and transfiguring the world. In him too we find the sense of human solidarity, in its specifically Russian guise of *sobornost*. Our task is to seek a new integration which will replace that of the Middle Ages on a new and higher level, allowing man's creative energies a free play which they did not enjoy in that authoritarian age.

No modern thinker has seen the need more clearly or expressed it more movingly than Collingwood. The Middle Ages, he says, did have their freedom: the freedom of occupying an ordained place which one is happy

in occupying. But just because the organism was healthy, its parts were bound to develop to the point where they would spring apart, each demanding a fuller freedom for itself, art for art's sake, and so on. Renaissance art became irreligious, but soared to previously unknown heights. Religion also grew to a new purity and intensity. But, since no man can serve two masters, you had to give yourself wholly to one of these activities to the exclusion of the others. Now we are experiencing the Nemesis. The Church has lost touch with the people, but she is not alone in this. The artist is free to paint whatever he feels gives him scope for self-expression, but no one wants to buy his pictures. Philosophy has become a parlour-game for experts in linguistic analysis. The scientist, as Joseph Needham is fond of pointing out, pursues his chosen work in an ivory tower, indifferent to its consequences for the world. But it is Brunner who, in his Gifford Lectures on *Christianity and Civilization*, has brought out most forcefully the consequences of this disintegration. Its worst horrors have only become apparent since Collingwood wrote in 1923: the emancipation of economic and political life, leading to the devastation of the soul produced by capitalist and Marxist pan-economism and the tyranny of the totalitarian state, armed with the will and the power to compel everyone to live as if the state had that all-importance which belongs by right to God alone.

What Collingwood wrote in *Speculum Mentis* over thirty years ago has been repeated with variations by practically every writer since who has dealt with our predicament from a theological point of view. It is the theme of P. A. Micklem's Bampton Lectures of 1946 on *The Secular and the Sacred*, of Christopher Dawson's Gifford Lectures of 1947 on *Religion and Culture*, of Brunner's on *Christian and Civilization* given in 1947 and 1948 and of much of the writing of Berdyaev and Tillich.

Where these writers differ from one another is chiefly in their view of the likelihood of the achievement of a reintegration and of the means by which it should be sought. Some of them are frankly pessimistic. Berdyaev was still hopeful. Having at one time pinned his hopes to Russian communism, he came in the end to favour something which one exponent of his thought has described as looking suspiciously like Mussolini's corporate state (E. L. Allen, *Freedom in God*, 42); he always took an unfavourable view of Western democracy. However inadequate his own attempts at a solution, his very detachment from our Western cultural outlook gives him a special value. Christopher Dawson makes the important point that we need to recognize that every social way of life may be a way to God, so long as it knows its limitations; part of our task is to co-ordinate different cultural traditions in a common religious unity (*Religion and Culture*, 211).

This may, indeed, prove easier than it has done for centuries, because the whole world is coming to acknowledge and adopt a common body of

scientific truth and technology. The fact that the new scientific culture lacks all positive spiritual content, and therefore all power of integration, may, as Dawson sees it, make it a purely destructive force. On the other hand, science itself requires order and faith and reason, and, in spite of their much publicized conflicts with religion, it was in some sense under the aegis of Christianity that science and technology developed. W. E. Hocking has pointed out that it is a striking and hopeful sign that a Japanese has written a book warning his people of the mistake they made in supposing that they could borrow parts of Western civilization without adopting its spiritual foundation, the Christian concept of personality (*Coming World Civilization*, 120).

Like Dawson, Tillich is acutely aware of the gulf between what the Church is offering the contemporary world and what the world needs, or thinks it needs, though of all modern theologians he seems to me to come nearest to providing the answer we are seeking. Individual salvation from sin and sermons intended to convince the mind are not likely to appeal to the disintegrated masses. The biblical fundamentalist, the dogmatist, the purveyor of easily grasped superstitions are more successful, though even they are likely to meet with only a limited response so long as they are reviving symbols that belong to the past in an age which is suspicious of anything that does not claim to be new. The superficially educated, when they become aware of their need for reintegration, are more likely to turn to the psycho-analyst than to the priest.

Yet deep down men are not self-satisfied, even if, to the churches they are passing by, they seem to find all they want in the motor-car and the television set. They are certainly not oppressed by a sense of sin, but it is still true that their hearts are restless and will remain so until they find rest in God. They are insecure and, as Tillich says, they are longing for a cause that will call out their latent enthusiasm and readiness for sacrifice. On the surface Roman Catholicism and Communism both have more power of mass integration than Protestantism. Yet each of these has its fatal weakness: Catholicism its tendency to deify that very imperfect means of grace, the Church, and Communism its enslavement to the state, which in theory is always about to wither away but which in practice becomes ever more oppressive and demonic.

Protestantism sees more clearly than either that there cannot really be a cleavage between the two spheres, the sacred and the secular, since God alone is holy and every man and institution and group is sacred only as it becomes a symbol of the divine holiness. For Tillich the ultimate hope lies in a Protestantism of the spirit blowing where it lists without ecclesiastical organization or traditions, operating through Catholicism, nationalism and communism alike, resisting in each the distortion of humanity and divinity that authoritarianism produces. He seems to look to its embodiment in a group akin to the Society of Friends which will understand the

Christian message as the reintegrating principle in the disintegrating world situation of to-day (*Prot. Era*, ch. xiv). We can only say, may his hope be realized! For the Christian must never lose sight of the 'hope that the creation itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God' (Rom. viii, 21); 'for it was the good pleasure of the Father . . . through him to reconcile all things unto himself' (Col. i, 19).

THE RE-INTEGRATION OF THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR IN THE LIFE OF THE CHURCH

By the Rev. Joseph McCulloch, Vicar of St. Mary's, Warwick

The Christian Church began as a lay and prophetic movement from within the Jewish Church—lay, in that it was un-sacerdotal; prophetic, in that it sought to proclaim the Word which God is speaking in creation. Christianity was primarily a faith that God had made Himself fully manifest in the Christ and that henceforth men need no longer walk in darkness but could have the Light of life. In that Light the life of this world was transformed into the life of the Kingdom, the true destiny of mankind. This was an interior or subjective life, realized as the human soul became newly orientated by the divine indwelling from the mind of the flesh to the mind of the spirit. From this interior life sprang a new community, compact of those who had become aware of the existential unity of the Spirit. This experience, the love of the brotherhood, gave Christianity its corporate coherence as the Church, capable of including all mankind in a unity which transcends all dualism. For the mind of the flesh is dualistic; it knows only by separating and distinguishing object from object: whereas the mind of the spirit is unifying: it knows by relating and atoning. The objective mind perpetually divorces: the subjective marries. For the one, life is 'either-or': for the other it is 'both-and'. Thus the Word of God in the New Testament proclaims that there is neither Jew nor Gentile, bond nor free, male nor female, but all are one in Christ. Real life is beyond duality.

If Christianity can be called a religion, it can only be as the religion to end all religions. It came into a world of many religions, each characterized by its particular division of human life into sacred and secular. This division is inevitable, since a religon must provide the individual with a way of reconciling himself to the unknown God. Reconciliation is needed because the individual feels within himself fear and guilt. It is in the subjective realm that he walks in darkness. As Blake says, 'Man has closed himself up till he sees all things through narrow chinks of his cavern.' He sees only the finite: but he is never entirely unaware of the

infinite. By psychological processes which we are now in a better position to assess, he projects this awareness and seeks God in the objective world, as though he could discern the divine through one or other of the chinks of his cavern. But spiritual reality cannot be objective. In the objective world there can only be symbols of spiritual reality. To quote Blake again: 'If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would appear to man as it is, infinite.' In his present mental condition, man separates certain symbolic objects from all others, as peculiarly sacred to the God *outside* himself. By attention to them, he seeks to become at peace with God, and he requires of a religion that it provide this separation of the sacred from the rest of life so that he may have the assurance that he can gain access through the sacred to God. Thus a religion which did not separate the sacred from the secular would not *a priori* be a religion. It would not effect what the ego-conscious viewpoint demands from the fact that it sets up 'I' over against 'It' and 'Thou'. From that viewpoint there must be secular and sacred, the things that are Caesar's and the things that are God's. It was therefore into a world of many religions that Christianity came.

These religions were usually characterized by a sacerdotal priesthood and ritual ceremonies, that is, by specially sacred men and sacred acts. As symbolic of divine realities, specially sacred men and sacred acts can have true spiritual value, but only in so far as they serve to reflect the true facts of the inner or subjective realm of experience, as outward and visible signs of 'that which is beyond, behind, and within the flux of things'. But man's projective tendency has always been to endow the symbols of religion with an objective reality. The besetting fallacy of religions, therefore, is that they locate God in the world of objects, and set apart a particular area of life as the divine province. Only within that area can the priesthood be exercised, and ritual acts have spiritual significance. Outside that area man does not look for God: it is not the realm of divine things, of the holy.

Jesus declared that he had not come to destroy the law or the prophets. But in many unmistakable ways he showed that he had come to destroy religious illusion. 'If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness'. He had come to bear witness to the truth, to the reality which could never be discovered by observation. The kingdom of heaven was neither here nor there, to be discerned and defined in one part or another of the visible world. Its reality was interior, subjective. 'The Kingdom of God is within you'. The realization of that Kingdom could not be achieved: it was given: it came upon you, and took possession of you, as light invades and illuminates a darkened room. God is our Father, the origin and ground of our existence, whose love is given fact. 'Eternity is in love with the productions of time'. The crux of that realization resides in the use of the first person singular, in understanding what Jesus has in

mind when he uses the pronouns 'I' and 'me'. 'No man cometh unto the Father, but by me'. 'Yet not I, but the Father'. All religious illusion emanates from the limitation of the first person singular in the mind of the flesh: the isolation of the ego in a mere corner of consciousness. 'Man has closed himself up'. Jesus came to liberate the human soul from its confinement, to enlarge man's consciousness of the Self, to turn him from the illusion that God is an objective attainable by individual effort, to the subjective awareness of God as the Lord of all Life and Lover of every creature, the Father who alone must be hallowed, whose Kingdom must come, whose will must be done. God alone is the Self of all selves, the Subject illuminating all finite consciousness. 'The knowledge of the holy is understanding', that is, the realization of God as man's true subjective life, illuminating the finite world through man. Thus man's true end is to be love as God is love. The fulfilment of all the law and the prophets is a living embodiment of the total awareness that God is love. This is the Word made flesh, God uttering Himself in creation. In that Word there is no discontinuity between the divine and human consciousness, and the infinite and finite are no longer opposed or mutually exclusive. True holiness is wholeness, the transcendence of all dualism.

The coming of Christ then is virtually the abolition of religion, i.e. of the religious division of human life into sacred and secular, consequent upon the illusion that God is an object (no matter if the chief object) of man's life. Christianity destroys what Whitehead has called the fallacy of misplaced centrality. The great event which the New Testament proclaims in the life of mankind is the restoring of its spiritual centre. God is no longer to be conceived as an objective exterior centre round which his creatures revolve. God is to be realized as the Self 'in whom we live and move and have our being'. Man must seek first that interior reality, and all the objects of the finite world will then be given their true significance and value. In seeking that reality, man must learn to say, 'I, yet not I, but Christ who dwelleth in me'. For at the centre of the Gospel is the truth that 'Only God may say "I": man's word is "Thou".' By realization of that truth in experience the mind of the flesh is transformed into the mind of the spirit. For that reason, Christianity was communicated to the first century world simply as a statement of existential truth by those who had been made aware of it in Christ.

It was because it could not be easily classified as a religion that primitive Christianity suffered persecution in the religiously tolerant society of the Roman Empire. Christians claimed no less than inside knowledge concerning the whole realm of life. Hence the tendency at first to confuse Christianity with one or another of the existing mystery-religions. But in fact the difference between them could not have been greater. The mystery-religion offered man a way to God. Christianity declared God's way in man, as the given and immediate basic fact of human existence.

The life of the Church therefore could not be confined and contained within a particular sacred preserve of human society. It had to become co-extensive with the life of man, judging and transforming morals and customs, involving all society in a tide of change. What the world saw in the first centuries of the Christian era was the force of the mind of the spirit, the impact of an interior spiritual life upon its civilization. This subjective invasion of the arrangements and organization of the external world-order was a bewildering and therefore menacing phenomenon. Government cannot entirely control those whose first allegiance is in the subjective world, those who have discovered in inner experience the realm of life in which all creatures live and move and have their being.

This subjective centrality seems to me the paramount feature of apostolic and sub-apostolic Christianity. The issue which Bultmann has raised does not, in my view, affect this palpable historic fact. Paul's sermon at Athens, for instance, stands quite independently of the kind of considerations involved in Bultmann's thesis. It could be preached in any age, pre-scientific, scientific, or post-scientific, with the same singular independence. It states mystery as the fundamental fact, as the common starting-point. This existential mystery is manifested in Christ, who corroborates the poet's intuition: 'we are God's offspring'. God is not, therefore, to be sought in temples or in sacred objects, but inwardly, subjectively, within the understanding. God makes himself known by His Spirit indwelling man, and by the same Spirit people of every nation and kind know themselves to be of one worldwide family, brethren in Christ. It is this subjective awareness of God's love which creates the Christian Church.

All this may seem an over-simplification of the New Testament. But it tallies with what we know of the general shape of the Church in its first age. It consisted of a laity grouped in communities and a ministry moving from place to place. The Christian group in each locality, and its direct or indirect connection with one of the first apostles, made the authentic Church. Its real life was 'hid with Christ in God'. Outwardly, its activity was in the world, its members permeating contemporary society, colonists of an invisible metropolis. In relation to all existing religions it maintained an unequivocal attitude. 'Whom then ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.' The new community claimed a knowledge which embraced all partial religious truths in its way of wholeness. The prophecies of Judaism were now fulfilled, the intuitions and insights vouchsafed to poets and seers out of every nation were now ratified and confirmed. The task of the Church was to bring all men into the knowledge of the subjective kingdom of God.

One may see the course of Church history as a gradual reduction of temperature: in the process the vapour is changed to liquid, and the liquid in turn congealed to fragmentary solid. In his *Descent of the Dove* Charles Williams has well described the stages whereby Christianity was changed

'from a dynamic of divine things to a fixity of social life'. My purpose here is to stress that in its first stage the life of the Church was an invasion of the life of the world by a realization of the inwardness of the divine realm. It was light from within illuminating all that was without. In that light the distinction between the sacred and the secular was shown to be fictitious. To enter the Kingdom, to know the fellowship of the mystery, to find himself in the way of redemption, a man must repent, and as an outward and visible sign of that repentance, accept baptism. From henceforth, his task was to do the works of love, to express, in the world without, the Christ within. The operative centre is where 'I' is no longer 'I' but 'Christ in me'. From that centre, 'the Spirit bloweth where it listeth'. At that centre, as George Fox was later to re-assert, 'friends meet in that which was before the world was'. Out of that meeting (again to quote George Fox) 'friends go cheerfully over the world, answering that of God in everyman'. The whole world was to be sanctified by the Spirit in the Church. The created order was to be redeemed through Christ in Christians, those who by repentance and faith were centred in Him, and thus members one of another.

The situation of professing Christians to-day is indeed a far cry from that first age of Christianity. The particular concern of this Conference, viz. the need to reintegrate the sacred and the secular in the life of the Church, defines the operative difference. For them the whole field of the world was open to the ministry of the Church, because a supreme movement of the Spirit had broken down the barriers of religion from within the mind of man. For us the barriers are up again, and the force of Christianity is inhibited. We know ourselves to be in a false position. The Church is over against the world, not in it. Our attempts to remedy the situation serve only to accentuate its falsity. One has only to take two familiar examples in our own country: the industrial chaplain and the religious broadcaster. The first is the Church's attempt to cross the gulf between institutional Christianity and modern industrial society: the second seeks by a modern means to communicate the Church's thought and life to modern man. Both in effect increase the emphasis on the fact that there is a profound division between the religion of the Church and the life of the world. There are those who would take refuge in the idea that this is the inevitable division between the natural order and the order of redemption. But such an idea is mere ecclesiasticism, i.e. the mistaken identification of the actual Church with the Kingdom of Christ, the means with the end. In honesty we have to admit that the existing gulf between the Church and the world is in very considerable measure a false dichotomy of life into secular and sacred. Christianity has somehow become a religion, and the Church a preserve of sacredness, largely preoccupied with the problems of its own continuance.

To re-integrate the sacred and the secular in the life of the Church

would seem to demand nothing less than a return to the roots of Christian existence. Which of our present presuppositions and premisses does not require ruthless re-examination? For instance, we assume that our difficulty is primarily one of communication. That assumption itself reveals another—that the word God speaks is in the Church and not in the world, that is to say, in the sacred preserve and not in the whole human situation. Apparently, our task is to communicate to the world a given word. But what exactly is the given word for the industrial civilization of the twentieth century? We can presumably say to modern man, 'Seek ye first the Kingdom. It is your Father's good pleasure to give you the Kingdom'. But he may rightly reply, 'What Kingdom? And *has* it been given you?' All we apparently have to offer in answer is a Christian religion, an authoritarian, dogmatic and ecclesiastical system in which a specially ordained ministry mediates to unordained man the specific objective means of his salvation. We ought not to wonder that few recognize in this offer any effective promise that the life of this world will be transformed into a life of greater reality.

The original offer was undoubtedly of such a kind. Christianity in its first age was never a religion: it was a way of living human life. Indeed that was its earliest description and title. Moreover, the Way was peculiarly distinctive because of its attitude to religion. This was determined by the fact that Christian living was the outcome of a fundamental change of mind, a revolutionary repentance. This change of mind saw the whole external world in a new light, in the light of the original creation, when 'God saw everything that He had made and, behold, it was very good'. Where this or that religion reserved one part or another of the natural order as sacred, Christianity swept on to consecrate the whole, taking the Jewish doctrine of creation and fulfilling it.

The new Christian mind had to be free from religious tabus and prohibitions, as its clash with Judaism revealed at the outset. 'Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty'. Man's true freedom in the created order is restored in the knowledge of Christ. 'Eternity is in love' . . . 'He has given us all things richly to enjoy'.

This new awareness of the Creator Spirit's life was the true and undoubted ancestor of the scientific spirit which has created modern industrial society. Had the spontaneity and inward freedom of early Christianity not become stifled and immured in the religious imperialism of the Papacy, had the Church of the Spirit survived beyond the third century, had in fact the accidents of Christian history been otherwise, the emergence of science as a proper, positive expression of Christianity would surely have come much earlier. In that event, our present question would not have arisen. The Church of the Spirit would have remained incarnate in the changing order, and liturgy and life would have retained their true correspondence. The Renaissance in its actual historical context was bound to make the

inevitable Reformation a disruptive and disintegrating force in a society dominated and confined by religious prejudice and constraint. Thus it may be true to say that in modern civilization the traces of original Christianity are to be found more in secular than in sacred society. Hence the ludicrousness of those in the Churches to-day who speak of taking Christ into industry. There is far more serious sense in the idea of letting the Christian spirit in industry get back into the Churches. Admittedly those occupied in the industrial world of to-day are not usually aware or articulately conscious in their tasks of personal obedience or self-offering to the All-Creator, but there is something in their community of techniques and skills which is nearer to the realization of the Kingdom than a great deal of our religious observance, and most certainly of our ecclesiastical activity.

Thoughtful Churchmen whose working days are spent in some field or other of modern industry are puzzled by a Gilbertian situation. They find a greater measure of human community, whether articulate or not, in the factory than in the religious assembly. They feel that by its very nature Christianity is that which makes for better human relations. If so, then what of the fact that in the modern world the betterment of human relations in industry, politics, and society in general goes forward without reference to the Churches? This was a problem which vexed Gladstone a century ago. He saw that institutional religion was declining but civilized morality, tolerance, kindliness, other-regard was increasing. We would need to be blind to-day not to see that our civilization gets along tolerably well without much benefit of religion—I mean that people are on the whole more humane and sympathetic than in former times, and yet have little use for the Churches. It is argued that this is because modern man is living on his Christian capital. But this argument carries no greater weight than that which can be adduced from the plain fact that a civilized community can dispense with the religion of the Churches. Among many to-day who have little direct knowledge of the ideas of Marx and Freud, it is felt that the religion of the Churches belong only to man's childishness. That is not to say that the secular world has dispensed with Christianity: it has simply ceased to believe that Christianity is contained within ecclesiastical boundaries.

The realist Churchman to-day must begin by recognizing that life is in many respects far more creative outside than within the Church. In the sciences, the arts, in politics, within the structures of industry and of modern social life, men and movements promise to make this a great creative age. In the Churches, however, there is still no comparable or related movement of the Spirit. The tragic aspect of our human situation is the plain fact that what the creativeness of the secular world most needs is precisely that which the Church of Christ should apply—the Christian understanding of all its manifold activity and achievement. But to supply that need, the Church must somehow open itself to the creativeness of the

secular world, become identified with it in fact as well as symbol. There is a Christianity embodied in the modern world which the Church must somehow find and articulate. But if that is ever to be accomplished, the Church, like the Prodigal, will first have to return to itself, to what I have called the roots of its Christian exsitence.

It remains for me to enumerate certain of the steps which I believe to be essential to the fulfilment of our task and the restoring of our true situation as the authentic ministry of Christ in the world.

Without any question the first of those steps is to recover the understanding of Christianity as an interior life before all else. The institutional Church to-day gives the impression of a complicated superstructure erected to strengthen the foundations. The more complicated that superstructure, the less the world believes that there are any foundations at all. It is significant that many considering Churchmen to-day beg to be excused from the preoccupations of the Church Assembly. They rightly feel that the most urgent concerns of the Church lie very much deeper in its life. They doubt that in our present state we have anything of existential Christianity to communicate to the world. Our doctrine of God, for example, and our ideas of prayer seem to many inexcusably naïve. Much of the Church's teaching and indeed of its professional theology betray the fundamental fallacy of objectifying God. The pattern of a great deal of worship reveals the old ego-conscious centring upon a Deity somewhere outside, with a sacerdotal minister standing as it were upon the frontier post between the sacred and the secular. We are beset by the errors of religious formality, as much in Catholicism as in Protestantism; it is seldom therefore that the reality of religion and the reality of life are clearly perceived as one and the same. The practical problem is how to reduce our present formal methods and techniques to a minimum. How can we reduce, for instance, the formal worship of the Church of England to an essential clear expression of the Christian understanding of the reality of life? By understanding I mean the corporate consciousness of a group who know as a common existential experience what it is to say, 'I—yet not I but Christ in me', and 'To me—to live is Christ . . . Christ liveth in me'. To achieve this return to the roots, the Church must study afresh the nature of Christian group-life. Religion thinks in terms of crowds—the more titular communicants and converts the better. Witness the recent unedifying exchange between Anglican and Roman Catholic bishops. Whereas Christianity is a matter of groups—meetings of people subjectively aware of God and of each other in Christ. Christian experience is the passing from ego-conscious to more deeply subjective awareness. 'We know that we have passed from death unto life because we love the brethren'. Thus in Christian practice to-day we need the minimum formal liturgical expression as well as non-formal meetings in which Churchpeople and non-Churchpeople may realize together their common understanding of the reality of life.

This leads to the second step required, the clearer formulation of the idea of creation. Ordinary people receive the impression of the Church's religion as something remote and unreal in every sphere except the ethical. Instead of focussing the attention upon God as immediately present in every manifestation of life, we usually turn it away either to the past or the future, to the mighty acts of God in history or to the destiny hereafter of the individual soul. Thus creation is itself something remote and unreal. The beginning is somewhere far in the past, not in the depth of existence. From this confusion stems the inability of the Church to relate liturgy to life. In corporate prayer and private meditation Churchpeople seem to be trying to bring God into life rather than realizing God in life. It is not therefore to be wondered that the sense of God uttering Himself in creation is found in the occasional mystic instead of in the ordinary life of the Churchman. It is not habitual in Churchpeople to relate man's creativeness to the absolute creativeness of God. Hence what goes on in a church building is sacred rather than what goes on in a factory. The idea that industrial design may show more of God than a form of a religious observance is unthinkable. Art is only religious when it depicts a biblical or ecclesiastical theme. Broadcasting is religious only when it is approved by the Central Advisory Council of the Churches. At the back of this confusion of mind is the persistence of the idea of the Creator as the first cause in a chain of causality. This concept removes God's immediacy of relation to all created things, it denies God's freedom from all externality. Only a new inwardness can recover the Christian understanding of God as self-identical not only in His transcendent Being, but also in His subject-object relation, in His creative energy. The Church's apparent idea of the Creator is, as the Scotsman said, that of a 'too wee God'. At all events, it has long been a difficulty to thoughtful Churchmen that the doctrine of the Third Person of the Trinity leaves in the mind more questions than answers. If all things are being created, i.e. lived rather than caused, by the divine imagination, in some sense they must be lived through man, or through *Godmanhood*, the theandric mystery of existence. Everything in man's life therefore must depend upon the mind of the Spirit, the existentially Christian mind. If we have not that mind, it is because we persist in starting at the ego-conscious level. We seek knowledge, but do not wait to be given understanding. We accept concepts about God for realization of God's immediacy. Before we can know what we are doing, we must become more aware of what we are. It is the way to that awareness which the modern world needs, and that need is sufficiently conscious to make numerous people outside the Church seek new ways of interpreting the Gospels, in the hope thereby of finding the mind of Christ which somehow the Church is obscuring from them. If we can reduce our formal worship to the simplest liturgical expression, it must clearly relate man's manifold creativeness to the work of the Creator, by consecrating the life

of man as it is under unmistakable symbols. We have to affirm the life of industrial society as well as judge it in the light of Christ. But we cannot make that affirmation or that judgment from a detached standpoint: only from within the world-situation, as being involved inextricably in it.

Now the fact is that the great majority of Church members are already involved in the secular world. They work in it: their lives are bound up inextricably with it. Why then are the Churches themselves apart from it? It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the apartness is due to the fact that the authoritative Christian ministry in the world is virtually confined to a specially ordained body of men, by vocation and training separated from the world. In theory, all Churchmen are still members of one Christian ministry. But the unordained are seldom well-read in theology or the mystics: they are therefore for the most part unwilling to engage in a field so far beyond their competence. Those who are moved to question the official teachings of the Church often prefer to withdraw from active membership rather than press their questionings from within. The result is that both the administration and thought of the Churches (and this is true both of Catholicism and Protestantism) are mainly left to the specially ordained. Unless this can be remedied, it is extremely doubtful whether the Christian ministry can become effectively articulate as primarily an interior life in the life of the world. Originally, the Christian Church was a laity expressing Christianity in the world, i.e. liberating within the created order the 'dynamic of divine things'. The history of the Christian Church from the first age to the present day is very largely a matter of clericalization, the virtual reduction of the Christian ministry to a specially religious enclave. When Protestantism replaced mass-priests with mass-preachers, it merely substituted one form of clericalization for another. Somehow escaping between the two, the scientific spirit was allowed to go its own way, and make a society from which to-day both are apart. Unless by the grace of God the Church can again become a genuine laity, articulated as the ministry in the world, it is difficult to see how the re-integration of the sacred and secular in its life can possibly be effected. The apartness of the Church both in thinking and living is considerably, if not entirely, due to the fact that professing Christians are divided into ministers of religion and very lay figures. The latter are at present incapable of integrating afresh religion and life: the former *ex officio* are not in a position to do so.

Recently, after re-reading F. D. Maurice's *Kingdom of Christ*, I came to the conclusion that what was required in our own situation—I mean that of the Anglican Communion—was a kind of Quakerization of our Church. I have never felt that to profess Christianity as both Quaker and Anglican need be an 'either-or'. For instance, if we must meet for worship twice on a Sunday, why not once after the manner of the simple Parish Communion and again of the Quaker meeting? The recovery of

the inwardness of Christianity and of the Church as a laity ministering in the life of the world might very well lie with the marrying of the liturgical movement with the quietism of the Society of Friends. Both have this in common, that they already see Christianity as a life and not as a religion; both seek to realize the coinherence of the faithful, centred in the awareness of the Spirit of Christ at the very roots of man's existence in the created order: both envisage the Christian ministerial task not as an invasion of the social order from without, but as truly incarnational, a life in the world, bringing to light the latent Christianity in all men.

I have the conviction that the first clue to the solution of our problem is to be found in 'the sacred ministry'—a phrase restricted in ecclesiastical use to one particular form of ministry in the Church. The second collect for Good Friday clearly states that *every* member of the Church has a vocation and ministry; but even that does not go far enough for our purpose. We have to recover the doctrine that all men and women have each a vocation and ministry, by reason of man's place in the divine creation. 'Man opens all things, but is himself opened by God'. The whole universe becomes articulate through man and through man alone. 'Yet not I, but the Father'. That is to learn Christ, and it is only thus that man can learn Him. In the world at large, in every area of human society, men are called to love and give and serve, and actually are doing so in their daily lives. Among them the Church must consist not of those who say 'Lord, Lord', but of these who do the will, and know what they are doing. If it is they who gather on the Lord's Day to break the bread and share the cup, there undoubtedly is the Church, and the world will know it, not by their claims but by all the signs of Christian life which throughout the centuries have always been unmistakable. And their Gospel will spread not because they seek to press upon the world the form of a religion, but because they are recognizably common men, only spiritually more articulate.

REVIEWS

A BOLD VENTURE IN CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY*

For many years now the philosophical world has been dominated, at any rate in the English-speaking countries, by a preoccupation with logic and the analysis of meaning, with the result that philosophical works have come to have less and less positive content. Even the continental philosophers who have kept apart from this trend have mostly espoused instead an 'existentialist' approach which has precluded any sort of unified and systematic study of human problems such as was once thought to be the task of 'lovers of wisdom'. The only two schools of thought which have tried to retain the older role for philosophy, scholasticism and Marxism, have been regarded by most philosophers as démodé and not quite respectable, and it must be admitted that the criticism has usually been justified.

After some decades of this concentration upon analysis, however, there are signs that philosophers are becoming restless and dissatisfied, although those whose whole training has been in the analytic schools do not know what to do about it. More and more, modern philosophy is afflicted with a sense of sterility, and I am sure the time is just ripe for a philosopher who accepts the findings of the modern schools yet at the same time is prepared to attempt again the task of presenting a single synthetic view of the whole of human life and knowledge. Professor Lonergan, of the Gregorian University of Rome, is precisely such a philosopher and his monumental essay, of a type which has not been fashionable for many years now, may in fact find a welcome in unexpected quarters. The fact that he is schooled in Thomism and is presenting what is essentially a new version of Thomist philosophy should not rule him out of court except amongst the ultra-prejudiced, since he really *is* 'in touch' with modern thought—scientific and psychological as well as philosophical—and he grounds his study in a thoroughly 'modern' treatment of a question which even staunch logical positivists cannot dismiss, the question 'What is understanding?'

This question provides almost the only point from which it still seems reasonable, even to the modern mind, to attempt to survey the whole of human life and knowledge, for as a matter of sheer fact all departments of human learning must rest on insight and understanding. Even the most thorough-going empiricist, therefore, could not deny to someone whose desire was to study insight the right to attempt a universal survey of how insight operates throughout human life. And once his starting-point has been granted, Professor Lonergan is capable of carrying his readers' interest through to the end; even if he does not secure complete agreement with his main conclusions, he will certainly provide many 'insights' of immense importance which should have a fertilizing effect upon philosophies very different from his own.

He seems to be remarkably well-equipped for the enormous task he has undertaken. He is a professor of dogmatic theology who has done historical research into scholastic philosophy, and his knowledge in this field is considerable, but he also has an astonishingly wide range of competence in more modern fields of learning. He is acquainted with the thought of most of the important modern philosophers—and

**Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, by Bernard J. F. Lonergan. (Longmans; 63/-.)

'acquainted', not in any superficial way, but with a real understanding of what has been their aim; his treatment of the problem of consciousness has much in common with Professor Ryle's for instance, and at several points in his argument he shows the insights of R. G. Collingwood and Gabriel Marcel, some of which he seems to have arrived at independently. But more than that, he is also very well acquainted with some of the most recondite but important developments in modern mathematical and physical theory, with modern discussions of the nature of scientific theories and statistical methods, with modern psychological and sociological findings, and with Toynbee's *Study of History*. (Particularly impressive to the present reviewer was the author's familiarity with the psychological theories of Harry Stack Sullivan, not a well-known worker in this field by any means, but likely to prove one of the most important, if not the most important, psychologist of our day.) And with all this Professor Lonergan has an excellent command of the English language, so that even where his book dives deeply—and it dives very deeply at times—it is never hard to read.

The book begins where any modern philosopher is more or less obliged to begin, with natural science, and Professor Lonergan's account of the nature of scientific method is admirable. It is indeed a major contribution to modern discussions about the philosophy of science which would be worthy of publication in its own right, and it shows a working acquaintance with scientific practice which many of the more fashionable 'scientific' philosophers might envy. The treatment of the nature and function of statistical methods is particularly good, and raises some of the fundamental questions about 'probability' and 'statistical significance' which are being raised by a number of modern philosophers—for example, by Mr. Spencer Brown, author of *Probability and Scientific Inference*, who has caused such a stir by casting doubt on the validity of the claims of 'psychical researchers' who use statistical interpretations of card-guessing to establish the existence of para-normal faculties like telepathy. Professor Lonergan would, I think, be in favour of Mr. Brown's scepticism here. Also in this connexion, he has suggestions to make about the origin of the 'uncertainty' element in modern quantum-physics which are most suggestive. His discussion of what, in a world of flux and statistical events, we mean by speaking of definite 'things' is, again, an important contribution to logical theory in its own right. But the most exciting thing in this first part of the book is the account which is given of the universe as a system of 'emergent probability', a system in which there emerge, in a non-systematic fashion yet for that reason inevitably (since for them *not* to emerge would be a systematic trend), ever more complex 'schemes of recurrence', integrations of things into schemes where classical physical laws can operate because each phase provides the conditions for the next in a cyclical pattern. This takes up the insights of the Marxist or neo-Hegelian idealists about hierarchies of 'levels of integration', as well as those evolutionists like Alexander, and at the same time adds something new and important by insisting that the elements which are integrated into a scheme of recurrence on a higher level are governed on their own level not by rigid mechanical laws but by *chance*.

This is a fascinating conception, for it suggests that the age-old contrast between philosophies of chance and flux and philosophies of order and purpose may be illusory. Quite apart from its ultimate philosophical significance, the notion of structure as a sort of self-sustaining eddy in a flux of chance—an eddy which is bound to occur somewhere, purely because the flux *is* random, and which, once created, has the ability to sustain itself over long periods and even a tendency to induce more complex eddies, purely as a result of the laws of chance—is a most suggestive one in relation to the fundamental 'theory of structures', which some modern philosophers

of science (e.g. Mr. L. L. Whyte, or Mr. G. Summerhof) regard as the most important realm of future scientific study. The notion is also suggestive in relation to the psychologists' discovery of a tendency for human behaviour to get stuck in self-perpetuating cycles (the 'repetition-compulsion' of Freud, or Karen Horney's 'cyclical causality principle'). It may even be a notion of theological interest, in view of the insistence of writers like Kierkegaard and Rosenstock-Huessey upon the importance for Christianity of the contrast between cyclical and progressive history (cf. Kierkegaard's *Repetition* and Rosenstock-Huessey's *The Christian Future*). For although the notion of a chance-universe has usually been regarded in the past as absolutely incompatible with a theistic view, Professor Lonergan insists that it is not so at all. On the contrary, his book moves inexorably, in its later chapters, towards a theological conclusion. The conclusion is based, however, as the Thomist case has always been, not upon any arguments about the pattern of things *in* the Universe but upon the fact that the Universe exists at all and can apparently be understood rationally in spite of including an ineradicable element of chance.

Before he even begins to argue his case for theism, however, Professor Lonergan turns from the natural sciences to the psychological and social sciences, and here a very neat and very important reflexive element enters into his argument. For he is concerned not merely to study how men obtain insight into human and social problems, whether by science or common sense, but also to point out that social life itself is govered by the degree of insight which, in their everyday situations, men are able to achieve. Having introduced this idea, he proceeds to develop the thesis that the concept of insight may be itself the basis for that unified view of individual psychology, social theory, history and ethics for which so many modern thinkers are calling, appalled as they are by the fragmentation of twentieth-century life. The controversial character of Professor Lonergan's philosophy begins to become more apparent here, but for all that there will be few readers who will not draw profit from his treatment of the issues, even though they may disagree with his main case. Thus his demonstration of the need for philosophical analysis to be applied to the proliferating concepts of 'depth-psychology' is admirable, and his attempt to make logical sense of Freud's highly anthropomorphic concept of the 'censor' which drives unpleasant mental elements into 'the unconscious' has much in common with (although it is quite independent of) that advocated by Professor John MacMurray: but MacMurray (and the present reviewer) would certainly not be prepared to follow Professor Lonergan in holding that all neurosis can be attributed to a 'flight from insight'—this would seem to lay altogether too much stress on the rational element involved in what is fundamentally an emotional process. The same over-emphasis upon rationality appears in his treatment of men's behaviour in society, yet for all that there is much to be learned from his analysis of modern tendencies to totalitarianism, and other dangers of present-day social movements.

With the aid of this concept of insight as the fundamental principle of practical human life, Professor Lonergan is able, in the final part of the book, to produce, by an extremely close-knit logical argument, a case not just for theism but for the full Roman Catholic doctrine of salvation through the One Church. He begins by arguing that, since we plainly do get insight into the character of the world by the process of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection, the best description we can give of the nature of Being is 'that which can be rationally understood'. This leads him to a restatement of the traditional Thomist metaphysical analysis of the categories of Being, which parallel the categories of knowing: and however much the reader may doubt the validity of the structure which he finds being built up around him, he will not find it easy to see any flaw in the argument, nor will he be able to dispute the

acuteness of Professor Lonergan's criticisms of such alternative philosophies as positivism or dialectical materialism. In terms of this metaphysical analysis, the theories of the various special sciences are criticised and set in logical order—and again, the reader will be unable to dispute the need for this type of philosophical criticism of the structure of scientific theories, however dubious he feels about the particular metaphysic in terms of which Professor Lonergan orders them. Then, finally, it is shown that, if Being is 'that which can be rationally understood', there must be a Universal Understander to account for the Universe of Being: but more than this, since all human insight is limited, and since failures of insight lead men into conflict and self-destruction, the only hope of achieving peace and order in human life is that the transcendent knowledge of the Universal Mind shall intervene in human affairs by means of a revelation in a divinely-ordered human life and a divinely-established society. Here, too, the argument is extremely closely-knit, and even the sceptical reader will not find it easy to see how he can escape the conclusion that he should join the Church of Rome forthwith.

There will be a good many readers, even amongst professing Christians, who will *want* to dispute this conclusion—not just because they do not happen to like the institution of the Papal Church, but because they feel in their bones that there is something wrong with this watertight intellectual scheme of life. Many Christians, in particular, will feel suspicious of the notion that the existence of God can be established by pure reason without appeal to revelation, and will revolt against Professor Lonergan's vision of a religious life which is lived entirely in terms of intellectual convictions and explicitly rules out the possibility of direct experienced knowledge of God: it is this, and not just (as Professor Lonergan supposes) the obsolete nature of the scientific ideas from which St. Thomas drew his illustrations, which has always been the essential cause of Protestant and Modernist rejections of Thomism. Perhaps the most valuable 'insight' of all which may come from reading this book will be that obtained by those objectors who take the trouble to ferret out the point in Professor Lonergan's argument where he unobtrusively turns into the road which thereafter leads inexorably to Rome. For the decision which Professor Lonergan makes at this point is one of profound significance for the whole situation of our time, and not just for theology.

The point occurs quite early on in Professor Lonergan's argument, when he is discussing the nature of scientific investigation. He speaks of scientific theories as being abstractions from experience, and criticises the common-sense notion that an abstraction is just a sort of 'impoverished copy' of reality. The applied mathematicians' law governing the fall of a stone is not, he quite rightly remarks, an impoverished copy of an actual experienced fall. But he then goes on to make the assertion that abstraction is in fact an *enrichment* of experience—and it is from this point forward that he is able without difficulty to establish his case that Being *is* 'that which can be rationally understood', a view which he can contrast favourably with all philosophies which attempt to identify knowledge with actual or potential sense-experience. (Very much the same argument was put forward by Dr. Mascall in his recent Bampton Lectures on *Natural Science and Christian Theology,* but Dr. Mascall was both more obvious and less cogent). From this, everything else follows, including the emphasis upon rationality in human life, which leads Professor Lonergan to identify virtuous behaviour with rational behaviour, and sin with irrationality.

It is my belief that there is no more important question for modern man to thrash out than this one: it is an aspect of the more general question which I tried to raise in my article on Bultmann in the June issue of *The Modern Churchman*. Do men

know the world by active living in it—by meeting people, by using things, by aesthetic participation in living forms—or do they know it by projecting into experience ('enriching' it, Professor Lonergan would say) the fantasy-patterns of their own minds? (To my mind the distinction between the highly logical fantasy-patterns of mathematics or Thomist metaphysics, and the more imaginative fantasy-patterns of mythology, is merely secondary, though of course important). The essential virtue of 'modern' thought, and of Protestant religion, lies, I believe, in the recognition that true knowledge (including knowledge of God) comes by the first of these methods, and that the second represents an attempt to escape from the fullness of life. True, it is a grave mistake to believe that knowledge comes only, or even primarily, through *sense*-experience—Professor Lonergan is able to make mincemeat of most 'modern' philosophies because they have made this mistaken assumption. But this is no reason for rejecting the valuable insight in the name of which 'modern' man broke away from the mediaeval synthesis of myth with metaphysics. What we have to do, in order to maintain that insight, is to insist upon two things: first, that science does *not* provide the pattern of true knowledge, *because it is not concerned with knowing the world at all, but only with working out how to use things;* and second, that true objectivity comes through direct *emotional* encounter with what is other than ourselves. Once these two points have been thoroughly understood it is possible to make use of all Professor Lonergan's positive insights without being led along the road to Rome—which is, I am sure, just one of a number of parallel roads back to the state of neurotic identification with nature from which mankind is only lately beginning to emerge.

John Wren-Lewis

THE BEGINNINGS OF RELIGION*

'Begin at the beginning and go on till you come to the end' was the advice which the King gave to the White Rabbit when he was called upon to rehearse the evidence against the Knave. This advice is equally good for all who would study the history of the religions of mankind, but it has not always been followed. Too often those who have concerned themselves with the question of the origins of religion have preferred to fabricate theories drawn from the beliefs and practices of the so-called 'primitive' peoples who live in the world to-day or to make deductions from what they suppose would have been the nature of primitive man. Such exercises have produced some truly fantastic ideas of how man first thought and acted about those parts of his experience which he could not understand or control. That the study of religious origins should have proceeded in this way is partly to be explained by the former lack of evidence which existed about the beginnings of human culture. However, archaeological research has steadily been amassing data concerning the life of man in the Upper Palaeolithic era (i.e. about 50,000 years ago); indeed a significant amount of information exists about the customs of *homo sapiens'* mysterious precursor, the so-called Neanderthal Man.

Those interested in this field of study, which surely has an unique interest and importance, have long felt the lack of a book which would gather together and discuss the great mass of relevant material which was scattered through a variety of specialised works, often difficult of access. Indeed, until Professor James wrote this book, there existed in English no single work devoted exclusively to the subject of religion in Prehistory, and the present reviewer knows only of one other such in an European language, namely, J. Mainage's *Les Religions de la Préhistoire* (1921),

**Prehistoric Religion*, by E. O. James. (Thames & Hudson, London, 1957, pp. 300; price 30/-.)

although the excellent chapters by M. Wernert in the great encyclopaedic work *Histoire générale des Religions,* tome i. (1948) should be mentioned.

It is obviously difficult to know where to put the *terminus ad quem* in Prehistory, for, when civilised urban communities were already existing in the Near East, men in north-western Europe were still living under a primitive Neolithic economy. Some scholars would make the criterion here the use of writing and the production of written records. Professor James has preferred not to recognize this line of demarcation in tracing out the main lines along which prehistoric religion developed, but to follow the theme on into the second millenium B.C., by which time in the Near East and the Indus Valley complex religious systems had been established in literate societies.

Professor James sees man's religious thought and practice as originally centring round the twin mysteries of death and birth and his concern about the supply of his food, and the investigation of these basic topics constitutes the main divisions of his survey. The question of the prehistoric concept of deity he significantly leaves to be discussed after he has completed this survey, although the issue begins to make itself felt at an earlier stage. This ordering is required by the nature of the extant evidence which primarily shows what man thought and did about his own destiny before he began to rationalize these practices in terms of relationship to some power external to himself.

It is man's care of his dead which differentiates him decisively from the other animals, although he was anticipated in this by his sub-human predecessor, Neanderthal Man. His careful burying of the dead, equipped with offerings of food and various ornaments and weapons, is concrete evidence that from the time of his first appearance in the archaeological record man shows himself as refusing to accept the fact of death as the definitive end of the members of his species. This response to the challenge of death was probably instinctive and the concept of *post-mortem* existence correspondingly naïve. It would seem that the dead were believed to live under the earth in a way similar to that in which they had lived upon it and that they needed at least the initial help of those who survived them to set them properly upon their new existence. There is evidence of some variety of belief about the nature of death and the condition of the dead. For example, many corpses were apparently tightly pinioned when buried, which must surely mean that in such instances the dead were feared as being capable of maleficent action against the living. Another puzzling custom, which was often observed, was that of covering the corpse with a red pigment. Some magical intent seems to be involved here: since red is the colour of blood, which was primitively recognized as a live-giving substance, it is possible that the practice represents an attempt at re-animation by means of sympathetic magic.

The evidence which the Palaeolithic burials afford of a preoccupation with the mystery of death is curiously balanced by evidence of a particular concern about the mystery of birth. On many sites there have been found figurines and other carvings of nude women with the sexual attributes grossly exaggerated. Professor James is of the opinion that the motive which inspired these representations was not erotic, but one which saw in maternity the assurance of new life. These Palaeolithic 'Venuses', as they are often called, have a further significance, because they also represent the beginning of a tradition of such images which can be traced on through the Neolithic period down to those of the Great Mother in her various forms as Isis, Ishtar, Astarte, Cybele and Aphrodite. Since the Great Mother, as the source of fertility and new life, was the Earth Goddess, it can easily be understood how she was early regarded as the protectoress of the dead, who were laid to rest within her,

and it would seem that the analogy between the womb of the earth and the womb of the mother was early appreciated. In the opinion of the present reviewer one of man's earliest intuitions of deity centred around the idea of maternity as representing the hope of new life to counter the despair of death; although Dr. James does not actually support this view in so many words, the material which he cites and his interpretation of it seem to go a long way in that direction.

The subject of Palaeolithic cave-art has become fairly well known since the discovery of the wonderful series of paintings at Lascaux in 1940. It is probably also common knowledge that the motive which is thought to have inspired the creation of these pictures was magical—a form of hunting magic. What is probably not so well known are some pictures, found elsewhere, which seem to represent men disguised in the skins and horns of animals; the most celebrated example is that known as the 'Dancing Sorcerer' in the cave of the Trois Frères in Ariège, France. Dr. James discusses these figures in connection with the institution of totemism as it is known in savage societies of the modern world. Although he does not think that totemism as such existed in these Palaeolithic communities, he believes that the seeds of it are perhaps to be found in the tension felt by the Palaeolithic hunter between his need to slay the animals for food and his very lively feeling of kinship with them. The present reviewer wishes that Dr. James had taken the opportunity here of discussing the Abbé Breuil's suggestion that in such a figure as that of the 'Dancing Sorcerer' we see a kind of 'embryonic deity'—an imposing numinous figure, in which the attributes of a powerful animal are united with the form of a man.

Space does not permit of further discussion of this important and fascinating subject. It must suffice to say that we should be grateful to Professor James, who has already done so much to foster the comparative study of religion in this country, for providing us with this valuable book, which is illustrated and equipped with bibliographies for further reading.

S. G. F. Brandon

EARLY CHRISTIANITY*

The student of Early Christian history, who has been brought up in the tradition of critical scholarship, will probably find himself puzzled in attempting to assess these two sumptuously produced volumes of Archbishop Carrington. Of the Archbishop's status as a scholar there can be no question, and these volumes, as well as his earlier works, attest the magnitude of his learning. Nevertheless this present work, as a whole, gives the impression of not truly coming to grips with the essential complexity of many vital issues with which it is concerned. The problem of assessment is made doubly difficult by Dr. Carrington's statement of his intention in this study: 'The "tendency" in this history is to trust the evidence, and the tradition of the church in which it was produced and preserved; and to tell the story as the evidence presents it after it has been fairly examined and criticized' (vol. i, p. xviii). It must be respectfully submitted that this intention could only be fulfilled by taking the statement here in its literal sense, which would mean that the work must be divided into two parts, namely, one containing an exact rendering of the record concerned, and another giving a critical interpretation thereof or a critical commentary upon it. Such a method, though laborious, could produce a work of very considerable value, for there could then be no doubt as to what the record actually said and what its commentator thought about it. But Dr. Carrington has not pursued this method, and his narrative is compounded of a digest of the documents concerned

*_The Early Christian Church_, by P. Carrington. 2 Vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1957; pp. xx+520 and xiii+519, illustrated; price 52/6 each volume.)

and his interpretation of them. This means that the documents sometimes are not allowed to speak for themselves. An important instance of this occurs in the account of Paul's conflict with the Jewish Christians at Antioch, which is recorded in *Galatians* ii, 11 sq. Paul here distinctly tells us that the trouble was caused by certain men who 'came from James' (τινας ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου). Dr. Carrington, however, who is evidently desirous of representing James, the Lord's brother, as holding a mediating position in this conflict which was so vital for nascent Christianity, comments, without giving his reasons: 'but it is not necessary to infer that James himself had dictated this policy' (vol. i. p. 89). Surely no one, without some *a priori* assumption in mind, would from the plain text of *Galatians* here infer otherwise than that these emissaries of James on such an occasion were representing James on a very important issue.

Attention has been drawn at some length to this aspect of Dr. Carrington's work, because on a cursory reading it appears to be a straightforward and uncomplicated exposition of the relevant documents. Of course, no historian can write without some tendency, as the Archbishop himself freely recognised. Where such a tendency is obvious from the nature of the work, and a fair discussion of opposing views, with full references, is given, the complex nature of the issues involved become apparent to the reader; but the true situation is often obscured here, because, although the existence of diverse views is often noticed, no adequate discussion follows which might indicate how matters really stand in the light of contemporary critical scholarship. Two cases in point might be cited here. In his account of the Ebionites and of the Pseudo-Clementine literature Dr. Carrington makes no reference to the important work of Professor H. J. Schoeps which has revolutionized earlier opinion in this connection. Then, from a reading of this work, no one would realize that the question of the re-interpretation of the primitive eschatology has acquired a completely new significance since the publication of Professor Martin Werner's *Die Enstehung des Christlichen Dogmas*.

These two volumes do indeed constitute a majestic survey of the origin and development of Christianity during the crucial first three centuries of its life. Since it is conceived on generous lines, almost every aspect of Christian life and the relationship of Christianity to its contempory environment is dealt with. Of particular interest is the attention given to the pseudepigraphical literature of the Church and to such writers, too often neglected in similar studies, as Hegesippus. Dr. Carrington also raises points of interest which have usually escaped notice, as, for example, when he suggests that the curious preferences and taboos about food observed by certain heretical sects afford a fruitful subject for research. The present reviewer is particularly gratified to find that Dr. Carrington recognises the importance of the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 to the extent of saying that it was 'the greatest historical event of the century next to the crucifixion of Jesus Christ'. He entitles one chapter 'The Fall of Jerusalem', thus giving this event an emphasis which was too often omitted or denied in earlier studies of Christian origins.

In view of the publicity that this work is likely to enjoy and which to a large degree it merits, it perhaps will not be thought ungenerous to draw further attention to some other points upon which its treatment of the beginnings of the Christian Church can be criticized. First, while the importance of James, the brother of the Lord, in the early days of the movement is recognized, the problem constituted by the silence of Acts about his antecedents and his apparent ousting of Peter from the position of primacy which he had according to the Synoptic record is not discussed. Next, the fact that Paul in two different places acknowledges that his opponents (whom Dr. Carrington himself would connect with the mother church of Jerusalem)

preach a different version of the faith from his own is passed over in silence: this is a fact of fundamental importance, upon the proper appreciation of which a true assessment of Paul's conflict with the Jerusalem leaders absolutely depends. Then, although the importance of Paul's farewell speech to the Ephesian elders is noted, nothing is said of its significance in relation to Paul's last visit to Jerusalem and James' attitude and action on that crucial occasion—a facing up to the situation here would clearly have made Dr. Carrington's view of James as a virtual supporter of Paul untenable. The formation of the *Corpus Paulinum* is briefly discussed, but no comment is made on the remarkable fact that the extant collection of Paul's letters shows evidence of loss and damage, which can only be explained by the intervention of a period during which the Apostle's reputation was eclipsed and his writings consequently not treasured. The strange episode of Apollos, as recorded in the Acts, is discussed and it is noted that it contains the only New Testament reference to Alexandrian Christianity; however, the even stranger fact of this silence about the beginnings of the faith in the second greatest city of the Roman Empire and of the defective nature of the Christianity imputed to Apollos are not mentioned. The tradition, preserved by Eusebius and Epiphanius, that the Christian community of Jerusalem fled for refuge to Pella in Transjordania before the fall of the city in A.D. 70 is accepted at its face value, and no attention is paid to the evidence that suggests that some at least of the Jewish Christians in Palestine were closely involved in their nation's cause against the suzerainty of heathen Rome.

The work contains bibliographies which raise some interesting questions, both for what they include and what they omit (e.g., although an illustration is given from J. Toynbee and J. W. Perkins, *The Shrine of St. Peter and the Vatican Excavations,* this book is not among those recommended for consultation, whereas the official Vatican publication, which is in Italian and is very expensive and difficult to obtain, is listed.) The two volumes contain a splendid set of illustrations, but many of them are only faintly related to the text and none of them is adequately described, which is unfortunate because they could teach much about the subject.

S. G. F. Brandon

WHAT MEAN THESE STONES?*

Professor Millar Burrows is already well known in this country for his valuable book on the Dead Sea Scrolls. The present work was first published in America in 1941; the version which now appears is a photographic reproduction of the original, and, undoubtedly in order to produce it cheaply, it is printed in very small type and the numerous illustrations, which are a valuable feature, are unfortunately rather indistinct. However, it is good to make this book available to a wider public, because although it is hard on the eyes, it is a most valuable book about the significance of archaeology for biblical studies. Not only Professor Burrows' own great reputation, but the fact that it has been issued in conjunction with the American Schools of Oriental Research guarantees its accuracy and lack of bias in a subject in which extravagent claims have sometimes been advanced. The book ranges over the whole field of ancient Hebrew culture and its environment as illuminated by archaeological research. An amazing and valuable collection of data is assembled here. One can learn of a variety of subjects of which the following are but a selection: ancient languages and writing; Neanderthal remains found on Mt. Carmel; the chronology of the Exodus; burial customs; Fr. Vincent's work on the topography of Jerusalem;

**What Mean These Stones?* by Millar Burrows. (Meridian Books, Thames & Hudson, London, 1957; pp. 306; price 12/6.)

archaeological evidence bearing on Pauline chronology; an anagram from Pompeii possibly witnessing to the use of the Lord's Prayer there before A.D. 79. Owing to the fact that the work has not been revised since its original publication in 1941, nothing is said of the Dead Sea Scrolls or Dr. Ruth Kenyon's remarkable discoveries at Jericho. However, the book can be strongly recommended to all who are looking for a cheap but reliable summary of the bearing of archaeological research (up to 1941) on the Bible.

DATTATREYA*

The publication of this book in English is one more indication of both the growing awareness in the West of the importance of Indian religious thought and the increasing confidence of Indian thinkers that they have a message which is relevant to the spiritual needs of Western society. The author is the present governor of the state of Mysore and Chancellor of Mysore University; he reveals himself as well acquainted with Western philosophical thought (but not of its contemporary phase of logical analysis). The interpretation of reality and man's relation thereto which is set forth here is centred around the concept of Dattatreya, a defiied saint who incorporates the aspects of the three great Hindu deities, Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva. To appreciate the work properly it would seem that some prior acquaintance with Indian philosophical thought is necessary, for Indian ways of thinking seem strange to most Western minds on first contact .The present work is built around translations of two ancient texts, the *Jivanmukta Gita* and the *Avadhuta Gita* and the author's commentary on them: the Sanscrit text is given in transliteration, together with excerpts from the *Upanishads,* cited by way of illustration. According to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, who writes the Introduction, the importance of the book lies in the fact that 'The works here brought together speak of the spirit behind all religions independent of the restrictions of dogma'. And he continues, significantly: 'Since this experience of reality cannot be adequately described, we must be gentle with the different versions of the experience. Spiritual humility should be our attitude and not dogmatic pride or intolerance. The forms we worship are the splintered images of the Divine Reality'.

**Dattatreya,* by Sri Jaya Chamarajendra Wadiyar Bahadur. (Allen & Unwin, London, 1957, pp. xv+285. Price 21s.)

OPERATION BARTH*

Barth's basic theological insight was found when, as a pastor in a Swiss village during World War I, he realised with great pain that he had nothing whatever to tell his congregation about God. He broke through this dilemma by hard work at the Scriptures, aided by the Biblical commentaries of Luther and Calvin. Barth had been trying to make God intelligible in terms of contemporary philosophical and social ideas and movements, and it was borne in upon him that a God who could be discovered on the human plane was no God at all but a human figment. Attempts to explain and communicate God in terms of the human and the natural were bound to issue in contradictions and paradoxes. This gave Barth his first theological insight, that the true and living God is *totaliter aliter,* wholly other than any or all of our ideas about Him.

*Barth, Karl: Church Dogmatics. Vol. IV. Part 1. The Doctrine of Reconciliation. Editors G. W. Bromily and T. F. Torrance T. and T. Clark. pages x—802. 1956.

*Berkouwer, G. C.: The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth. Paternoster Press. pages 414. 1956.

It is interesting to reflect in this connection that this was exactly the same theological pilgrimage which Luther experienced. Luther's argument was that the theology of his day was not theology at all but a spurious kind of theological philosophy. He de-philosophised theology and found a saving theology in the Scriptures—a ministry of the Word. Luther's real attack, years before the more dramatic publication of the Theses (1517) or his stand at Worms (1521), was against Scholastic Theology and Aristotle in particular. Consider, for example, Luther's early disputations culminating in his *Disputatio contra Scholasticam Theologicam,* 1517. As Luther preserved and intensified this insight throughout his career, so has Barth preserved and intensified his original insight, and as Luther developed as a direct consequence of his theology into a great preacher and teacher, so has Barth.

In this mighty *Kirchliche Dogmatik,* Barth works out a new Church theology whose material is taken from Church Proclamation and its norm from Scripture, a theology wherein every school of philosophy and every particularist theology is expunged. It was his impasse as a preacher that really drove him on to the discovery of this theology, and has led him to the task in which he is now so creatively engaged. Every word in this project is derived from the living process of communicating the Word from God to man without the Word. If we sometimes deplore the fact that he takes so many words to offer this One Word, let us at once admit that the reward is worth the labour. It is not that he is verbose, for technique and content are closely wedded: he talks round and round his subject—the more he talks, the more we learn.

In the volume under review, Barth handles Part I of his doctrine of reconciliation. The editors explain: :

> 'Barth's account of the doctrine entails three part-volumes devoted to the three forms of the doctrine corresponding to the threefold confession of Jesus Christ as very God, very Man and the God-Man. The first form—the theme of the present part-volume—starts with Christ as the God who humbled himself as a servant to accomplish the work of reconciliation. The second is concerned with Christ as the royal man in whom man is exalted and adopted into the fellowship with God. And the third treats of Christ as the God-Man who is the Guarantor of atonement.'

The place the doctrine occupies in the Dogmatik is significant. After beginning with the Word of God, i.e. God in his concrete revelatory work, he maintains that God can be known to man *only* because God makes Himself known. Next, he handles his doctrine of God, the heart of which he sees as the doctrine of Election, and the effect of which is to reverse the traditional understanding of Law and Gospel into Gospel and Law, and to give a Christological foundation to Law which excludes any and all foundation in natural law or orders of creation. His third section is his doctrine of Creation which he views only from the point of view of Election: this means that the world is able to be seen as a creation instead of a cosmos only to the eyes of faith, and to the eyes of faith alone. Creation he maintains is indissolubly related to the covenant of Grace in Jesus Christ: the Scriptures do not witness to the *prima causa* but to the Lord of history, the God of Israel. It is at this stage that Barth turns his attention to the centre and essence of his Dogmatik—the doctrine of reconciliation.

It is common knowledge that Barth's theology is Christological, that he thinks of God exclusively in terms of Jesus Christ, but his Christology never involves an antithesis between *Christo*logical and *theo*logical considerations. Barth's argument is that we cannot know *beforehand* what God is or will do: we see God only in Jesus Christ, and then know what He is, and what He can do. Reconciliation is the

action, substitution and suffering of the man Jesus Christ, and in that we learn the essence of His deity and the true majestic nature of God. This he sees as the power of God revealed in the Cross, and this revelation offers a fresh form of the *theologia crucis* and of an ethics of the cross.

Christ was not first humiliated and thereafter exalted. The being and nature of God is revealed *in* the humiliation. At this point we meet a new aspect of Barth's doctrine of reconciliation. The substitutionary and representative character of Christ's work did not take place outside of man, but His dying implied our dying. God could have left His revelation at the point of the dying of Christ, but He did not. He raised Christ from the dead, and in that justified Christ and also the whole of sinful mankind.

This central section of the work where Barth deals with the substitutionary and representative nature of the work of Christ, a work which he sees as completed by God's own work in vindicating His work in Christ by means of the Resurrection, is foundational to Barth's thesis. Disturbing though it is, it is done with a very firm and reassuring hand, and demands the closest scrutiny.

At this point Barth examines the doctrine *simul justus et peccator*. Barth declares that it is Himself God justified, and thereby consequently man. God justified Himself in the Incarnation by His own stand against evil and chaos (das Nichtige), and at the same time, and by that action, justified man the sinner. Man as a sinner is justified and is on his way from 'the whence' of darkness and sin to 'the whither' of the new man in Christ: man is in a process, and this process is time.

In bringing his discussion on Reconciliation to an end Barth raises the question of how a man is to know this doctrine of Justification and know it as a certainty. His answer is the certainty of faith: not as a work but as directed to Jesus Christ alone. There is no striving after justification but an exclusion of striving: all meritoriousness of faith is rejected. This act of faith is possible only through the Holy Spirit, and therefore Barth concludes his first part of the doctrine of reconciliation with a discussion of the Holy Spirit viz.: 'The Holy Spirit and the gathering of the Christian Church', and 'The Holy Spirit and the Christian Faith'. It is the Holy Spirit which opens man up to the miracle of reconciliation: the Holy Spirit frees a man to that state at which he is able to acknowledge reconciliation.

There is not a point of doctrine or tradition, not a word of Scripture, which at the touch of Barth is not in some way reconstituted, recreated, re-charged and enriched. It is invidious to select passages from work at such an exalted level, indeed impertinent, but the reader has cause to pause and reflect many times. Particularly significant are his quiet and firm answers to Bultmann's Entmythologisierung, especially in the subject matter of incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection. (In fact, this volume may be considered to some extent a sustained rebuttal of Bultmann's theology.)

Further, there is his disturbing emphasis on the doctrine of substitution. In this doctrine, which includes for Barth both the ideas of representation as well as substitution, there is envisaged the utter displacement of the sinner by the Risen Christ, as well as the doctrine of His heavenly intercession. It is interesting to recall that our own Anglican theologian O. C. Quick strove towards the bringing together of these two ideas of representation and substitution in his *Doctrine of the Creeds*. At a time when the doctrine of substitution is unpopular, Barth's views demand all the more careful consideration.

Another subject which he discusses at a high and sustained level, is his handling (to the extent of 150 pages) of the doctrine of Justification by Faith. This subject he brings right down to the point of assurance of the certainty of Justification. His treat-

ment of *simul justus et peccator* is from the divine side as well as the human. Sin had entered and challenged God, and God Himself entered and took position against evil and chaos. Man does stand at God's left hand, part of all this sin and chaos (*peccator*); but once God had entered, this same man stands at His right hand as the object of Election, reconciled, safeguarded (*justus*): therefore he is *simul justus et peccator*. The whole passage is enheartening, strengthening, victorious, and is very welcome in an otherwise defeatest and depressing age.

But every subject could be instanced in detail: the reviewer is only selecting the passages which appealed to himself. There is no substitute for reading Barth: to wrestle with Barth is to undergo a course of theological shock therapy which loosens all the old associations and ideas leaving the reader with the chance of forming fresh ones.

The Roman Catholics are right in seeing Barth as the true logical development of Reformation theology. He is the most thoroughgoing outcome of the Reformed tradition. It is alleged that his influence in Germany is waning, and certainly there are signs that such is the case, but apart from Scotland, it could hardly be claimed that British theologyy has measured up to Barth. The current translations of the Kirchliche Dogmatik certainly give us less excuse.

One happy outcome of this mighty solo 'Operation Barth' is the number of books it begets. Dr. Berkouwer's long study of Barth provides a valuable analysis of Barth's theology. This he sees as a contention to set into the midst of Christian theology and Christian life the central motif of the sovereign, triumphant grace revealed in Jesus Christ. It is a scriptural examination and assessment of Barth's work. The book is masterly, fair-minded, serene and reverent; it has the qualities of that other valuable book on Karl Barth written by the Roman Catholic theologian von Balthaser: *Karl Barth—Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie*. Koeln. 1951.

Just as it may be mischievous to sum up Luther's theology by the catchword *sola fide*, or Calvin's by 'the sovereignty of God', it is fraught with danger to sum up the theology of a man of Barth's stature by any one leading conception, even one so central as grace. If this limitation be remembered, of which Berkouwer would be aware as any one, his resolute and lucid and informed criticism of Barth from the standpoint of both the Reformed confessional tradition as well as his very conservative and evangelical Biblical theology, demand consideration. He questions whether Barth for all his massive appeal to Scripture has in fact done justice to the Scriptural doctrine of Grace. He is entirely with Barth in his opposition to synergistic theology, but complains that Barth does not allow the real freedom of serious human decision which Berkouwer claims the Scriptures do in fact allow. Many British theologians would assent here. In a very interesting passage Berkouwer thinks that in the final analysis Barth's doctrine of Grace makes for an ultimate, ontological impossibility of unbelief and sin, which is not fair to history, and the logic of which leads to a doctrine of universalism. He offers a very good Biblical criticism of Barth's doctrine of eternal life, which Barth views in an original way as an eternalising of the life that has been.

The value of this work rests in its sincere and informed discussion of Barth's theology. Those who find wrestling with Barth too exhaustive an exercise could read Berkouwer with profit. There is no substitute for reading Barth himself, but certainly Berkouwer gives a valuable and very readable account of Barth.

Hull University. JAMES ATKINSON

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of the *Modern Churchman*

Sir,

DE-MYTHOLOGIZING

Since Mr. Lewis has invited further discussion, the following points seem to me to be relevant.

With the main point that the Gospels presuppose everything summed up in the phrases 'veil for hierarchies' and 'behind the veil', I fully agree. It is the large scale abandonment of this outlook which is the root cause of the unhappiness about religion characteristic of our modern urbanized societies.

With the implied point, that Comte and the average man are necessarily right in rejecting the ideas connected with phrases such as 'behind the veil', I equally fully disagree.

They may be right: and again they may be wrong. It is not a matter for opinions or *a priori* theories, but for hard objective scientific enquiry.

For it is no more obvious that the term 'occult' is wrong, than it is obvious that so-called solid matter can be resolved into energy working on the universal cosmic pattern of many little things running round something even smaller in the centre. So much so, that it has taken thousands of years to lay bare the facts in the one case, and may well take the materialistic-minded European mind just as long to discover the facts in the other.

Secondly, it is an elementary principle that where there is a similarity of mechanical patterns, one's first expectation is that there will be a similarity of energy results. Wheels large or small produce a smoothness of movement not found when one revolves a tyre on which many flat surfaces have been worn. If then energy working on the now familiar nuclear pattern, but under the conditions of wave length and frequency associated with physical matter, produce or leave room for what we call consciousness, there is no *a priori* reason why the same energy working to the same pattern under widely differing conditions of wave length and frequency not associated with physical matter should not also produce or leave room for consciousness. Certainly one's first expectation should be that this would be likely to be the case.

Thirdly, there is a considerable body of evidence directly pointing to consciousness dissociated from the physical. I myself have had one such experience in which I was able to observe my physical surroundings and make some detailed mathematical calculations as to my exact position in physical space.

My conclusion is therefore that the urgent need is not for wasteful theological argument, but for hard and sustained enquiry designed to find out why it was that the East so early in human history attained and retains such a deep-rooted conviction that the 'occult' is as real as the physical. After all, it is facts which count: and as S. Paul shrewdly observed, if there is nothing in the Resurrection, there is nothing of lasting worth in Christianity or any other religion.

Yours sincerely,

August 10th, 1957 G. C. N. Webb

John Wren Lewis writes:

I am very glad of the opportunity to answer Mr. Webb's letter, since it gives me the chance to say something which I can now see I should have said in the article itself instead of merely implying it.

What appears to worry Mr. Webb, and a number of other critics who have spoken to me about the article personally, is my agreement with the 'modern mind' and the Freudian psychologists in dismissing the idea of the occult. Mr. Webb and my other critics interpret this as meaning that I dismiss the possibility of non-physical realities, but I tried to make clear in the article that this was not my intention at all. Moreover, I think Christian apologists gravely misunderstand the modern mind if they believe that it wants to insist upon the sole reality of the physical. It may have been driven into that position in its attempts to wrestle with superstition, but what the modern scientific mind really wants, and what I want, is to insist upon the primacy of *objective experience* as against *fantasy*. I was careful to say in my article that by 'occult' I meant not simply 'unseen' but 'beyond the possibility of any kind of experience whatever'. And lest it be thought that I am tilting at an Aunt Sally here, it should be borne in mind that the official theology of the Roman Church holds quite explicitly that Being cannot be experienced, but only known by intellectual apprehension. In my view the essence of the Protestant protest, with which I wish to align myself, is its emphasis on the primacy of experience in religion, and my argument was that this is but one aspect of a much more general protest against the domination of life by belief in realities which cannot, in this life at least, be *known* at all, but only *known about,* through myths or metaphysics.

Now insofar as the modern mind *does* try to limit 'experience' to 'sensory experience', it does run into the danger of ruling out all religion and all spiritual values, but I am convinced that this is only a passing aberration from which science itself will rescue us, just as Mr. Webb suggests. What I was concerned about in my article was to urge that theologians and others should *not* be misled by their desire to combat materialism, into a return to superstitious 'mythological' or 'metaphysical thinking, *which I am certain is a far older and far greater danger to true religion than materialism.* What I omitted to make clear enough in the article was the point at which I think we do need to part company from the traditional positivists. This is a very important point, and in my own experience I have only encountered two writers, Professor John Macmurray and Sir Russell Brain, who have really grasped it. What we have to insist upon is *the objective validity of the feeling-element in experience.* I believe it can be shown that this element in experience is in fact just as primary, and just as capable of telling us about objective reality, as the purely sensory element, and once this is granted I believe it is possible, as I have tried to indicate in my other writings, to re-discover all the great religious truths as assertions about the experienced Reality which is prior to any other in our knowledge, namely, the reality of Love.

It is clear from Mr. Webb's letter that he is really just as anxious to insist upon the primacy of experience as I am; to this extent we are fighting precisely the same battle. What I do not think he sufficiently appreciates is the danger to which my article was intended to call attention, of mistaking the minor skirmish against materialism for the real battle, which is against that superstition that can eat the heart out of religion without apparently changing its assertions at all. It is my belief that, contrary to the common notion, the real duty of Christians to-day is to align themselves with the more creative representatives of the 'modern mind' in fighting against the age-old enemy of false religion (i.e. religion conformed to the 'paranoia' of the fallen world), which was responsible for the crucifixion of Christ. Christians will certainly continue to use myths and metaphysical notions in their language, but it is absolutely crucial that they should recognize that these are tools for men to use, and must never be allowed to become men's masters. It is in *that* sense that the 'mythological world-

view' has in my opinion been rightly destroyed, and if it were really true, as Mr. Webb suggests, that the Christian religion is bound up with this world-view, then I could not be a Christian. My article was meant to say precisely that Christianity was really utterly opposed to such a world-view in the beginning, but was perverted to conform to it later.

Sir,

In his interesting article on 'Theological Issues in the Baptism-Confirmation Controversy', Dr. Lampe argues very effectively against the Dix-Thornton view that membership of Christ and sonship to God are relationships to Christ and the Father which can be had without the indwelling of the Holy Spirit; and I agree with his conclusion that that view 'is theologically and empirically absurd'. But I also have my own quarrel with Dr. Lampe! For he seems to hold that membership of Christ, sonship to God, and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit are gifts of God given in Baptism, whereas I hold—with, I think I can rightly claim, that great nineteenth-century theologian, F. D. Maurice—that these 'gifts' are given, not to some human beings at Baptism, but to *all* human beings at birth—that, in other words, human beings are members of Christ, children of God, and participants in the Holy Spirit not only if, and because, they are members of the Church by Baptism, but because they are members of the human race by birth. According to this view, Baptism is God's witness to this universal truth, and admits the person into Christ's World-Redeeming Body, the Church, in which he will be helped by its teaching, and by the intensified grace of the Holy Spirit in its sacraments and fellowship, to live according to that truth and to take his part in the work of world redemption—the work, that is, of bringing mankind to the knowledge of, and practice of, their essential divine sonship in Christ and his indwelling Spirit. Such a view seems to be behind these quotations from Maurice: 'Mankind stands not in Adam but in Christ. This relation is fixed, established, certain. It existed in Christ before all worlds. It was manifested when he came in the flesh.' 'The truth is that every man is in Christ; the condemnation of every man is that he will not own the truth.' And '. . . the covenant presupposes an actual relation between mankind and God in Christ. The covenant does not constitute the relation. It makes it manifest. It is the way in which men enter into, and realize, the relationship with God and their brethren which is still the law and constitution of their being, even if they practically deny it by refusing to enter into it. To enter into the covenant is to be drawn out of separation or individual isolation into a body in which the universal relationship can be realized.'

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Dr. Lampe writes:

I agree with the writer, and with F. D. Maurice, that baptism witnesses to the status of sonship to God which all men possess by virtue of creation. I hold also that it is the effective symbol by which a person is brought within the sphere of Christ's redemptive work. He is born into a society which is in a state of rebellion against God and in large measure disowns its proper creaturely relation of sonship. Baptism transfers him into the community of Christ's people and brings him within the scope of redemption, which is restoration to sonship. This can be properly regarded as a positive gift.